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ABSTRACT
Four multiattribute decision analysis models were constructed to examine a
public agency's decision about where to site a sewage sludge treatment
facility. The models looked at the siting problem from four different
perspectives--as a technical problem, as a political problem, as a conflict
resolution problem, and as a risk management problem.
The results of the models showed that the preferred choices of sites differed
when the siting problem was viewed in different ways. The advantages and
pitfalls of using decision analysis for controversial public policy problems
were examined. The methodology is valuable as a tool for problem
formulation, but is less useful for actually making public policy decisions.
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PREFACE
Facility siting will be one of the most vexing and frustrating
problems facing environmental managers in the 1990s. As the need for
large-scale waste management facilities--for disposal of sewage sludge,
hazardous waste, solid waste, low-level and high-level nuclear waste--
becomes a crisis, public opposition to these facilities mounts, resulting In the
"not in my backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome being played out in every area of the
nation.
How can environmental managers deal with the NIMBY syndrome?
How can they make siting decisions that they can justify before regulatory
agencies, legislatures, the courts and the public? In many siting situations,
decision makers are faced with deadlines, little information, and intense
political and public pressure. Are there any decision making aids that can
help environmental managers under these circumstances? Formal analysis
usually involves substantial time, information, money, and the hiring of
experts. (Behn and Vaupel, 1982) Are there any tools that decision makers
can use informally to try to structure their complicated siting problems and
gain insights about these problems?
In this thesis I argue that decision analysis, particularly simple
applications of multiattribute utility analysis, can aid decision makers in
understanding complex facility siting problems. The thesis follows a
hypothetical decision maker, Alexandra Smith, as she uses decision analysis
models to look at a facility siting problem from four different angles.
Although Smith is a fictitious character, her decision problem--where to site
sludge treatment facilities for the cleanup of Boston Harbor--is a real one.
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The information she uses is actual data collected by consultants for the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA), the state agency charged
with the harbor cleanup. The sites she considers and the circumstances
surrounding her decisions are the same as those facing the decision makers
at the MWRA. All of her judgments and values, and those of other parties
involved in the problem, are hypothetical, however.
I do not attempt to draw conclusions about where the MWRA should
site its facilities. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how one type
of mathematical model can help a decision maker formulate a siting problem.
The judgments made by my hypothetical decision maker are based on my
intuitions about the sludge siting problem, and should not be attributed to
anyone involved in the actual siting decision.
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INTRODUCTION
The Boston Harbor is the most polluted harbor in the nation. Most
of the pollution results from outmoded sewage treatment plants that serve 43
communities in the greater Boston area. Sewage is not properly treated by
the system--at best, when all facilities are working properly and the system
is not overloaded, sewage receives only primary treatment. Solids are
allowed to settle, the waste water is chlorinated, and both the solids (called
"sludge") and the treated waste water are dumped into the harbor.
Currently, the system dumps 500 million gallons of partially treated effluent
and 70 dry tons of sludge per day into the harbor. (Save the Harbor, 1987).
An additional 15 million gallons per day of raw, untreated sewage never even
reach the treatment plants, and flow into the harbor through combined sewer
overflows (safety drains that were designed at the turn of the century to
prevent backups at the treatment plants during rainstorms; many drain
sewage into the harbor during dry as well as wet weather periods). The
sewage from the combined sewer overflows, the treated effluent from the
plants, and the sludge are all contaminated with toxic chemicals that are
contributed by households and industries.
The pollution of Boston Harbor has had substantial effects on the
environment and economy of the Boston area. Over 64 percent of the
shellfish beds that border the harbor are closed; use of the remaining beds is
restricted to professional fishermen who send their catch to purification
plants. Beaches are frequently closed due to health risks. Harbor flounder
have the highest national incidence of liver and skin tumors, and about 17
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percent of the bluefish in Massachusetts Bay are contaminated with
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). (Save the Harbor, 1987).
In 1985, a federal district court found the Metropolitan District
Commission (the state agency that ran the greater Boston area water and
sewer system) in violation of the federal Clean Water Act (Conservation Law
Foundation v. Metropolitan District Commission, September 5, 1985). The
court ordered the state to construct new sewage treatment facilities to
comply with the Act. While the litigation was being decided, the
Massachusetts legislature created a new agency to deal with the harbor
cleanup--the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA). The new
agency was given authority to raise revenues through bonds and rate
increases.
The federal court set a stringent schedule to bring the sewage
treatment system into compliance with the Clean Water Act. (Conservation
Law Foundation v. Metropolitan District Commission, May 8, 1986). The
project includes construction of a state-of-the-art secondary treatment
facility. The MWRA was ordered to stop dumping sludge into the harbor.
The agency must develop a land-based method for treating sludge by 1991
and implement it by 1995.
Sludge is one component of what the MWRA terms "residuals".
Residuals are materials that are removed from municipal waste water during
treatment. They include grit (sand-like materials that quickly settle out of
waste water), screenings (large items, such as wood and rags, that are
collected from waste water in coarse screens prior to primary treatment),
scum (floatable materials such as grease, oil and plastics that are skimmed
from the surface of waste water as it flows through large settling tanks),
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and sludge (settled particulate matter and microorganisms removed by
sedimentation during primary and secondary treatment). Sludge is the largest
single component of wastewater residuals.
Sludge may be treated and disposed of using several technologies:
incineration, composting, landfilling, and ocean dumping. The MWRA is
prohibited from deep sea dumping by the federal Ocean Dumping Ban Act of
1988. Exclusive use of landfills would require more empty land than is
available in the area. The MWRA is studying two technologies: incineration
and composting. Incineration burns residuals to remove the water and
reduces the remaining residues to ash. Composting converts residuals to a
humus-like material that can be used for horticultural purposes. (MWRA,
1987).
Alexandra Smith, a planner recently hired by the Massachusetts
Water Resources Authority, faces a difficult decision. Her task is to choose
a site for the sludge treatment facility and to get the facility built. The
agency has been studying the siting problem for two years, and a few weeks
before Smith started work, her predecessor announced that his siting team
had narrowed a preliminary field of 299 sites to seven candidates for further
evaluation. The agency has invested a lot of time and money in site
evaluation, so Smith cannot realistically start the process all over again.
She must make a decision from among the seven sites recommended by her
predecessor. She must also try to learn about the siting problem so that she
can design a strategy to deal with any opposition to her decision.
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Why Facility Siting Decisions are Difficult to Make
Smith realizes that like many planning problems, facility siting
decisions are "wicked"--messy, ill-defined problems that rely upon political
judgment for resolution. (Rittel and Webber, 1973). Facility siting decisions
pose harder questions than simply: Where should we put our facility? Such
decisions have a complicated structure- -engineering, political, environmental,
economic and socioeconomic considerations are all involved. A facility siting
decision is like a puzzle into which many pieces must be fit. A decision
maker cannot easily solve this puzzle with intuition. (Keeney, 1980).
A facility siting decision also Is hard because many uncertainties
exist about problem definition. (Fischhoff, et al., 1981). Is Smith's problem
merely to find the best site, engineering-wise, for the facility? Since the
agency is under court order to site a facility quickly, maybe her problem
Isn't a technical one at all, but a decision about which choice of site will
allow her to implement her plan quickly. Smith is well aware of daily media
reports about the "not in my backyard" syndrome, in which the
implementation of carefully made siting decisions based on technical
considerations are delayed or even stopped by the protest of community
groups. Perhaps the sludge facility siting problem is a conflict resolution
problem--one in which she must negotiate with community groups to gain
their acceptance of her decision. The two technologies the MWRA is
considering, composting and incineration, pose certain health risks. Is
Smith's decision problem a risk management problem?
Multiple objectives are the hallmark of facility siting decisions.
(Keeney, 1980). Smith wants to find a site that is good technically, but she
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also wants to save as much money as possible, since the MWRA's ratepayers,
who are already suffering from increasing water and sewer bills as the
harbor cleanup begins, will have to pick up the tab for the sludge treatment
facility. Smith is also concerned with the environmental impacts of the
facility. Under the National Environmental Policy Act and its state
counterpart, the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, the MWRA must
consider the impacts of its projects on the environment. The agency is also
naturally concerned about environmental impacts--after all, its primary goal
is to clean up Boston Harbor, and it would be ironic if it polluted another
area in the attainment of that goal. Smith also is concerned about public
safety--she wants to choose a site that has the fewest health impacts and
the smallest traffic accident potential. The existence of these multiple
objectives necessitates another complicating factor in siting decisions--the
need to make value tradeoffs (Keeney, 1980). Obviously, Smith's objectives
will be in conflict with one another. She cannot protect the environment to
the fullest extent and also keep costs to the minimum. A technically
"perfect" site may have the soils, geology and transportation network access
that the facility needs, yet be located near densely residential
neighborhoods. In order to make a decision, Smith must determine, either
explicitly or implicitly, how much reduction in the level of achievement of
one objective she is willing to accept in order to raise the level of
achievement of another objective.
Siting problems are also complicated because in many instances, it is
not clear who is the decision maker. In the sludge siting case, Smith is
charged with deciding on a site, but her decision must be ratified by the
MWRA's Board of Directors. If the agency decides on acquisition of private
land for its site, it must apply to the state legislature for eminent domain
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authority. The legislature is free to review the siting decision, and could
very well overturn it.
The siting problem is further complicated by other political
constraints and considerations. A siting decision must be justified before
regulatory agencies and the public. If environmental groups or abutters to
the site sue to overturn the choice, the agency's decision is subject to
scrutiny by the courts. Interest group politics can affect the acceptability
of decisions. (Bidwell, et al., 1987). Facility siting decisions are often
susceptible to the "passions of the moment". For example, Smith has recently
heard that a group of legislators from the communities on the final sludge
site list have organized to pressure the agency to choose Spectacle Island,
an abandoned island in Boston Harbor, as the facility site. Suddenly, the
press, politicians and citizen groups are saying that Spectacle Island is the
best choice. It is tempting to Smith to give in to these pressures and make
a decision without looking at the complete problem. Politics can also easily
turn a specific problem--in this case, where to put a sludge treatment
facility--into a much wider issue. (Bidwell, et al., 1987). Community groups
and local officials, complaining that the final seven sites are all located in
working class neighborhoods, have cast the sludge facility siting issue as one
of class conflict.
Facility siting decisions are often dependent upon uncertainties
about decisions made by other government agencies. (Keeney, 1980). For
example, the MWRA must meet federal Environmental Protection Agency and
state Department of Environmental Quality Engineering standards for the
chemical and heavy metal content of its sludge. The MWRA's sludge is full
of toxic chemicals and heavy metals, and it is working to eliminate them
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from the waste stream in order to meet existing regulations. However, the
EPA has proposed new rules that would make the existing regulations more
stringent, and there is uncertainty about whether the MWRA will be able to
meet the new standards.
Facility siting decisions involve many difficult measurement
problems. The MWRA is considering many criteria for siting, and the
measurements of these criteria are like apples and oranges--they cannot
easily be compared or combined into a single measure of a site's performance
on the criteria. (Ortolano, 1984) For example, how does Smith compare the
loss of a threatened species' habitat with the loss in residential property
values around a site that a sludge treatment facility might cause? Siting
decisions also involve many intangibles--factors for which there is no
obvious way to measure the impact. (Keeney, 1980). How should Smith
measure concerns about aesthetics, or the psychological "stigma" many
neighbors feel would attach to them when they live near a waste treatment
facility? The impacts of the facility are uncertain--will there be
environmental, socioeconomic, and health impacts? How much impact will
there be? How important is the impact? (Keeney, 1980). Impacts can occur
over long time horizons. How can Smith measure impacts on unborn
generations? How does she set bounds on the time period in which to
consider the sludge facility's impacts?
Siting decisions are further complicated by the presence of many
interested social groups--"stakeholders" in the decision. The costs and
benefits of the sludge treatment facility will affect various groups
differently. People who live around the harbor and use it for fishing or
recreation will benefit from cleaner water. People who live near the sludge
- 13 -
treatment facility may see environmental damage and declining property
values, may have to put up with noise and odors, and may suffer adverse
health effects. Equity issues therefore become very important and emotional
in a siting decision.
Although many government and industry officials attempting to site
noxious facilities often believe that the questions surrounding the choice of
site are purely technical, Smith believes that they actually involve many
value judgments. No overall experts exist for siting decisions. (Keeney,
1980). The decision maker may receive input from engineers, scientists,
public relations specialists, financial managers, and land use planners, but
there is no one person or group of experts that specializes in facility siting.
Each separate group of experts brings its own values to the siting decision.
Lay people also bring their values to the problem, and their attitudes about
the probability of the occurrence of impacts and the magnitude of these
impacts often differ radically from those of experts. (Fischhoff, et al.,
1981). Value conflicts between these groups are often exacerbated by
scientific uncertainty about impacts, whether due to insufficient data or
contradictory findings. (Bidwell, et al., 1987). The values people hold about
the siting problem may be "labile"--unformed, evolving and apt to change.
(Fischhoff, et al., 1981).
Finally, siting decisions are hard to make because they involve high
stakes. (Keeney, 1980). A poor decision may result in massive, irreversible
environmental damage or illness or death for many people. Building facilities
costs hundreds of millions of dollars, costs that in the sludge case will be
borne by ratepayers already squeezed by rapidly rising rates. A politically
unpopular decision could result in many costly political battles, and could
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cause delays in building the facility that would violate the court order.
Scarce resources--staff talent, time, information, and money--could be
wasted on a poor decision. Perhaps most importantly, a poor decision could
cause a public already skeptical about its government's ability to solve
problems competently and fairly to become further disillusioned. (Keeney &
Raiffa, 1972).
Theories of Facility Siting
Smith realizes the difficulties inherent in her siting problem. She
wants to make a good decision, and wants to be able to gain public
acceptance for that decision. She believes that if she can gain more insight
into the sludge facility siting problem, she will be able to choose a strategy
to increase the probability that her decision will be accepted by the public
and eventually implemented. Before she thinks about a technique to help
her formulate her problem, however, she reviews the various theories about
facility siting strategy.
The traditional siting process has been described as a "Decide--
Announce--Defend" model. (Ducsik, 1978). Typically, the project proponent,
which may be a private company or a government agency, defines the siting
problem (e.g., what type of technology to use, what type of location in which
to site, whether to use satellite plants or one large facility), makes a list of
possible sites, screens them using technical criteria developed by its experts,
then announces the final siting candidates to the public. Public
participation comes into the process only when the agency prepares an
environmental impact statement. The proponent's decision is usually met
with loud, emotional protests, legislative attempts to exempt certain sites,
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and legal challenges to the environmental impact statement. (O'Hare, Bacow
and Sanderson, 1983).
Often, state governments try to improve upon this process by
removing control over siting from localities and placing it in the hands of a
state siting agency. "Preemptive" siting is highly centralized, and its
proponents usually argue that it is legitimate because only the state has the
technical competence or impartiality to make a controversial siting decision.
When a decision must be made that involves localized costs but regional
benefits, they argue, the state is in the best position to make the cost-
benefit tradeoffs.
Preemptive strategies generate as much opposition as do traditional
methods, perhaps even more. (Elliott, 1984). Many people value the concept
of home rule for localities, and are insulted that their communities are not
allowed to determine their own fates. People often do not believe the state
is an impartial and fair decision maker. Using a purely technical process to
site a facility is unacceptable to many local residents--they realize that
many value judgments and uncertainties are inherent in any technical
process. Preemption heightens the adversarial nature of the siting process
by placing the state in clear opposition to local interests.
A third siting strategy recognizes that people have legitimate
interests, fears and concerns in the siting process. This strategy
acknowledges that most people would oppose the siting of a noxious facility
in their community. According to this theory, people rationally weigh the
costs and benefits of the facility, and determine that the costs will far
outweigh the benefits. Proponents of this strategy argue that if the benefits
obtained by the community are increased enough to balance the costs,
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residents will no longer oppose the facility. They propose that project
proponents pay compensation to the host community. Compensation can take
several forms--monetary payments to the general town treasury; payments to
provide specific services (e.g., increased fire protection); or in-kind
replacement of natural resources, physical amenities or services. (O'Hare,
Bacow and Sanderson, 1983). Some proponents of this strategy have
suggested that if "creative" compensation is offered--jobs, better schools,
parks, traffic improvements, etc.--eventually, towns will actually compete for
the "privilege" of having a facility in their community. (Raiffa, 1985).
The compensation strategy is not an easy solution to the siting
problem. The strategy assumes that all social costs of a facility can be
compensated, rendering people neutral to the facility. In fact, these costs
may not be easily monetized and compensated. Many people find the idea of
putting a price on health or the environment abhorrent. (Bacow and Milkey,
1982). People may feel that they are being bribed to accept a risk that is
in fact unacceptable. Most people are uncomfortable with offers of
compensation when they perceive that the offers are designed to alter their
decision to accept a facility or reject it. (Elliott, 1984). Attitudes in the
community towards compensation may differ--people farther away from the
site may like the idea of increased revenues for the town, and may pressure
neighbors near the facility to drop their opposition. It is difficult for a
project proponent to satisfy the compensation demands of every party who
might oppose the siting decision.
Critics of these siting strategies have developed a new process,
called "open siting". Open siting acknowledges people's concerns, and tries
to give the interested parties in the siting debate a real role in decision
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making. Most open siting processes involve negotiation and mediation to
resolve the factual and value conflicts surrounding siting questions. Under
this theory, project proponents should acknowledge the local community's
power to slow or stop the siting process; avoid implying that community
opposition is irrational or selfish; help the community get the resources and
information it needs to participate in siting decisions; consider issues and
concerns raised by the community; consult with the community at the very
beginning of the decision process; and involve the community in direct
negotiation to meet its concerns. (Sandman, 1985).
The final siting theory is based on the belief that public health
risk management issues are the crux of any facility siting debate.
Communities see noxious facilities as a threat to their health and safety.
Conflict about siting arises because of the different ways experts and lay
people perceive risk. Technical risk assessments calculate risk by
multiplying the probability of the occurrence of an event by the magnitude
of the consequences of the event. Most scientists and other technical
experts concentrate on the probability of the occurrence of an accident.
Most members of the lay public concentrate on the magnitude of the
consequences of an accident. Studies of risk perception in the general public
have discovered the following patterns:
People are more willing to accept familiar risks than unfamiliar ones.
People are more willing to accept voluntary risks than risks forced
upon them.
Risks controlled by others are less acceptable than risks under one's
own control.
Undetectable risks are less acceptable than detectable risks.
Risks perceived as unfair are less acceptable than risks perceived as
fair.
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Risks that do not permit individual protective action are less
acceptable than risks that do.
Dramatic and memorable risks are less acceptable than uninteresting
and forgettable ones.
People are more willing to accept certain risks than uncertain ones.
(Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, et al., 1982; Sandman, 1985).
Elliott (1984) has proposed that project proponents work with these
patterns of risk perception and try to negotiate a contract with a host
community to site a facility. The contract would give the residents of the
community an amount of control over the operation of the facility, thus
making the risks posed by the facility more acceptable. Elliott argues that
community residents and the facility operator need not agree on the precise
likelihood of a risk in order to negotiate such a contract. They must,
however, reach agreement on the characteristics of risk to be managed (e.g.,
risk of groundwater pollution from hazardous waste landfill leachate, risk of
health effects from an incinerator). Under the- contract, the operator of the
facility agrees to install prevention, detection and mitigation systems..
Community residents are allowed to independently monitor these systems. If
something goes wrong at the facility, the community has the power to move
decisively against the hazard should the operator fail to do so. The
contract should also include liability provisions and an agreed-upon
structure for jointly solving problems and resolving disputes as conditions
change. Because this arrangement gives the community control over the risk,
people find it more attractive than offers of compensation or assurances of
mitigation. (Mazmanian and Morell, 1988).
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The Sludge Facility Siting Decision -Problem
What strategy should Smith use to site the sludge treatment
facility? Is her siting problem a technical one, to be solved by using the
Decide--Announce--Defend and preemption strategies? Or is it a conflict
resolution problem, resolved by negotiation with stakeholder groups, payment
of compensation, and using an "open siting" process? Perhaps she has a risk
management problem-- therefore she should concentrate on negotiating a
shared-management contract with host communities. None of the siting
theories deal with the intense political and deadline pressures Smith faces.
Perhaps her strategy should be to choose the site where she believes
opposition from politicians and neighbors would be the weakest--the
politically easiest, most expedient site.
Smith would like to analyze the siting problem from four different
perspectives. She decides to first assume that the problem is a technical
one. Next, she will look at the sting decision from purely political
considerations. Third, she will formulate the siting decision as a conflict
resolution problem, and will try to find areas of agreement and disagreement
among various stakeholder groups. Finally, she will look at the siting
decision as one concerned solely with public health risk issues.
Smith decides to use formal analysis to look at the siting problem
from these varying perspectives. It is clear that her decision problem is too
complex to be solved using informal common sense. It would help to be able
to break the problem into more manageable pieces. (Covello, 1987). She has
a great deal of data and many issues to consider, and formal analysis will
help her keep track of issues and information systematically. Information
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about the problem comes from many different sources--environmental
consultant reports, agency financial analyses, public comments and
statements, Smith's own political intuitions--and formal analysis provides a
structure for integrating these varying types of information. (Keeney, 1980).
She will eventually need a rationale and documentation to support her
decision. Formal analysis could give her ideas on how to structure such
documentation. (Keeney, 1980). Finally, using formal analysis will force her
to so some hard thinking about the problem--to understand where value
judgments are involved, where uncertainties occur, and what value tradeoffs
are necessary to make a decision. (Keeney and Raiffa, 1972).
Because the sludge siting problem seems to involve many
uncertainties (including uncertainty about what type of problem the decision
is), Smith will use a specific type of formal analysis designed to explicitly
treat uncertainty--decision analysis--as a tool to gain insight into her
decision problem.
Decision analysis is a set of philosophies, axioms and methods to
analyze decision problems. The axioms imply that the attractiveness of
alternatives should depend on the likelihoods of the possible consequences of
each alternative and the preferences of the decision makers for those
consequences. 1
1. Keeney (1982) summarizes the axioms of decision analysis as follows:
Axiom la (Generation of Alternatives). At least two alternatives
can be specified.
Axiom lb (Identification of Consequences). Possible consequences of
each alternative can be identified.
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Decision analysis involves eight steps:
1. Identifying alternatives.
2. Defining objectives.
3. Defining ways to measure each alternative's performance on each
objective.
4. Identifying uncertainties.
5. Assessing the probabilities that outcomes will occur.
6. Assessing preferences for outcomes and tradeoffs among objectives.
7. Integrating components of the analysis and evaluating alternatives
Axiom 2 (Quantification of Judgment). The relative likelihoods (i.e.,
probabilities) of each possible consequence that could result from
each alternative can be specified.
Axiom 3 (Quantification of Preference). The relative desirability
(i.e., utility) for all the possible consequences of any alternative
can be specified.
Axiom 4a (Comparison of Alternatives). If two alternatives would
each result in the same two possible consequences, the alternative
yielding the higher chance of the preferred consequence is
preferred.
Axiom 4b (Transitivity of Preferences). If one alternative is
preferred to a second alternative and if the second alternative is
preferred to a third alternative, then the first alternative is
preferred to the third alternative.
Axiom 4c (Substitution of Consequences). If an alternative is
modified by replacing one of its consequences with a set of
consequences and associated probabilities (i.e., a lottery) that is
indifferent to the consequence being replaced, then the original and
the modified alternatives should be indifferent.
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8. Conducting sensitivity and value-of-information analyses. What if
probability judgments were changed? What if preferences were
different? What if different tradeoffs among objectives were made?
Would obtaining further information about uncertainties change the
results?
(Covello, 1987).
Smith believes that decision analysis is the best formal tool to
apply to the sludge facility siting problem. She realizes that the problem
involves many subjective judgments. Decision analysis incorporates
subjective judgments into its methodology. (Keeney and Raiffa, 1972).
Decision analysis explicitly deals with uncertainty and with conflicting
objectives--both of which are abundant in the siting decision. Smith also
likes the fact that decision analysis measures preferences in the
commensurable units of "utiles"--she is uncomfortable with having to reduce
intangible values into monetary terms, which she would have to do if she
chose cost-benefit analysis as her tool. (Covello, 1987). Finally, decision
analysis will allow her to perform value-of-information analyses. The
results of these analyses will help her decide where to expend her limited
budget of time and money to seek more information to resolve the
uncertainties in the problem.
Smith decides to use decision analysis techniques to model the
sludge facility siting problem four different ways--as a technical problem, a
political expediency problem, a negotiation problem, and a risk management
problem. She does not intend to rely on these models to provide a solution
to the siting decision; instead, she will try to see what insights about the
nature of the problem she can gain by using decision analysis to look at the
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problem through four different lenses. Where do uncertainties exist in the
decision? How much more information does she need to inform her decision?
What are the implications of the tradeoffs she must make? Are there any
sites she can confidently eliminate from further study? Is the choice of
preferred site clear? Which problem formulation is she most comfortable
with?
The following four chapters describe the models Smith builds. The
seven sites she considers are:
DEER ISLAND: a 200 acre peninsula off the town of Winthrop. Legally
part of the city of Boston, Deer Island is owned by the MWRA. The
MWRA's primary sewage treatment plant is located here, and the
secondary treatment plant will also be built on this site. The site
also contains a prison, and is near Logan International Airport. The
closest residential community is Point Shirley, part of Winthrop,
directly north of the site.
LYNN: a 48 acre industrial site on Lynn Harbor. Located next to a
dairy plant, the city of Lynn's sewage treatment plant, and its
sludge/ash landfill. The site contains a closed landfill. Lynn is not a
member of the MWRA's sewage and water service district.
QUINCY: 150 acres on the Weymouth Fore River. Previously owned by
General Dynamics, was a major shipyard. Now owned by the MWRA,
which will use part of the site for interim sludge treatment projects
and as a staging area for construction of the secondary treatment
plant on Deer Island. The site is contaminated with hazardous waste.
The Massachusetts Shipbuilders Corporation proposes to lease 50 acres
to operate an active shipyard. Well-established marine and rail
transport facilities exist on the site. Several major industrial projects
are proposed for areas nearby, particularly a hazardous waste
incinerator directly south of the site in Braintree and an electrical
power plant across the river.
SPECTACLE ISLAND: A 97 acre island in Boston Harbor. 35 of its
acres have been added through the dumping of trash by the city of
Boston. Owned by the City and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Has at different times been used as the site of a quarantine hospital,
resort hotels, a grease extraction plant, and a repository for salvage
firms. The site is covered with trash, and has been proposed as the
disposal site for fill from Boston's Central Artery reconstruction
project. This fill could stabilize the island, which has also been
proposed to be developed into a state park.
STOUGHTON: 90 acres of industrially zoned land covered by
gravel and asphalt operations and forest. The site abuts an
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industrial park and small industries. The area used to be a rural, low
density residential community until Route 24 was built. It is now an
industrial park district containing scattered residences.
WALPOLE: 74 acres of mostly forested land zoned for limited
manufacturing. The site was formerly the Bird family estate. It is
adjacent to single family residences and an abandoned industrial
facility, and is located near the Neponset River.
WILMINGTON: 50 acres, 90 percent of which are zoned residential.
The eastern portion of the site is being developed as a 43 unit
subdivision. Abutters include an industrial park, an office park, light
industrial and commercial uses, and residences.
The consultants hired by the MWRA have produced thick, heavy
reports containing environmental and engineering information about each site.
Since Smith is trying to gain some understanding about the nature of her
problem and to decide what further information is necessary to make a
decision, she decides to use only the information in the reports and her
current knowledge about the sites in her models. The consultants' reports
contain the following information:
The availability of potable water, sewer, electricity, and natural gas
utilities on the site.
A description of access route characteristics.
A list of regional burdens already hosted by each community.
A list of federal and state environmental permits required to construct
the facility.
An evaluation of whether construction at a site would require unique
or scarce labor or material resources.
A description of other public and private uses proposed for each site.
Information about the cost of building each type of facility (not site-
specific).
A description of the geology at each site.
The location of surface water bodies on or near the site, and the
water quality of these bodies.
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A characterization of ground water on and near the site, including the
type of aquifer, depth to ground water, and water quality
classification.
The location of existing public water supplies on or near the site.
The presence of threatened, endangered or special concern plants and
wildlife on or near the site.
A general characterization of the plants and wildlife on each site.
The location and type of wetlands on each site.
A description of any fisheries resources located on or near the site.
Details on climatology and meteorology of the eastern Massachusetts
area.
Air quality at the site.
Noise levels on and near the site.
The distance from the site to sensitive noise and odor receptors.
The presence of air emissions interaction sources within 3 kilometers
of the site.
A classification of the site as being of low, moderate or high
archaeological sensitivity.
The presence of historical resources on or near the site.
Land uses on the site and within one mile.
Land uses on proposed transportation routes.
Preliminary dry deposition rate maps for airborne particulates.
(MWRA, 1988a, b, c).
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THE TECHNICAL MODEL
For her first cut at the siting problem, Smith decides to frame the
problem as a technical one--where is the best site, technically, for a sludge
treatment facility? What are the geological, physical and institutional needs
of the facility? What laws and regulations must be satisfied to obtain
permits to build the facility? What costs--construction and operating--are
involved in building and running the facility?
The technical decision is complicated by the fact that Smith is not
sure what type of processing technology the MWRA will actually end up
using--composting or incineration. While the agency prefers to use
composting, it may not be able to market its composted sludge unless it is
able to reduce the amount of heavy metals in the sludge. To do so would
involve an expensive and aggressive pretreatment permit enforcement
program. Smith is unsure whether the agency has the resources to implement
such a program, and whether the program would succeed in removing
adequate amounts of metals from the sludge even if enforcement resources
did exist. The uncertainties surrounding the technology choice are further
complicated by the fact that the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has proposed stringent rules to control the land application
and marketing of sludge. (U.S. EPA, 1989). Smith is unsure whether the
agency's sludge will even be able to meet the standards for compost
marketing. She decides to treat the technology choice not as a choice at all,
but as an uncertainty over which she has no control.
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Smith summarizes the decision before her in a decision tree (Figure
2-1). The seven sites--her decision alternatives--emanate from a decision
node, labeled "D" in the figure. The uncertainties in the decision--what the
technology will be--are located on the chance branches, off the node labeled
"C". Smith judges that there is a 50 percent probability that the agency will
be able to compost its sludge.
Smith realizes that many different criteria will go into her modeling
of the problem, so she decides to use a multiattribute model to find utility
rankings for each site under each possible technology. She will feed these
results into the decision tree to find the expected utility of each site given
the technology uncertainties.
Structuring Objectives for the Decision
First, Smith tries to structure her objectives for the siting decision.
Objectives can be broad (e.g., protect the environment) or narrow (e.g.,
minimize damage to endangered species habitats). Most objectives have two
components--a general concern (e.g., protect wetlands) and an orientation for
preferences (e.g., minimize adverse effects on wildlife or maximize ease of
implementation). (Keeney, 1980). The collection of broad and narrow
objectives forms an "objectives hierarchy". The objectives hierarchy for any
decision is not unique--there is no "correct" objectives hierarchy. It is
based on the judgments of the decision maker as to what is and is not
important. (Keeney, 1980).
Objectives can be identified in several ways. The decision maker
can perform a literature search. What objectives have other siting studies
used? What are the regulatory requirements a facility operator must satisfy
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FIGURE 2-1
DECISION TREE STRUCTURE FOR THE TECHNICAL MODEL
DEER ISLAND_ C COMPOSTING
C"(.50) 0.0
INCINERATION
(.5) 0.0
,LYNN C CONPOSTING
C(.50) 0.0
INCINERATION
(.5) 0.0
QUINCY C COMPOSTING
C H.50) 0.0
INCINERATION
(.5) 0.0
SITING DECISION_ D SPECTACLE ISLAND
D !
C COMPOSTING
C(.50) 0.0
INCINERATION
(.5) 0.0
STOUGHTON C CONPOSTING
C (.50) 0.0
INCINERATION_
(.5) 0.0
WALPOLE C CONPOSTING
CH.50) 0.0
IINCINERATION_
(.5) 0.0
|ILMINGTON C CONPOSTING
C (.50) 0.0
|INCINERATION____
(.5) 0.0
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to obtain construction and operating permits? (Keeney, 1980). The decision
maker can also identify objectives by specifying a broad objective and then
breaking it down into narrower objectives. (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). For
example, a decision maker might identify "protect the environment" as a
broad objective, and break it down into several narrower objectives, such as
"minimize damage to wetlands", "minimize air pollution", "minimize impact on
ground water", etc. Finally, a decision maker can identify objectives by
using "casual empiricism"--by observing how people who are involved in the
problem are thinking about it. (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). For example,
engineers involved in the sludge facility siting decision may be analyzing the
soil quality at each site, and the agency's financial analysts may be thinking
about the problem in terms of construction and operating costs.
Smith uses these techniques to identify twelve objectives:
1. Choose the most reliable site--the site where the facility can best
operate consistently and effectively throughout the life of the project.
What amount of "down time" will the facility have? What backup
processing will be required? How accessible is the site to the trucks
and barges that will be delivering the sludge from the sewage
treatment plant?
2. Choose the most flexible site--the site that can accommodate
either processing technology, and can accommodate fluctuating
quantities of sludge.
3. Choose the site where construction will be easiest--where
extensive blasting or reconfiguration of the site is not necessary, and
where new roads or piers would not have to be built.
4. Choose the site where the utilities needed by the facility--potable
water, sewers, electricity and natural gas--are already connected to
the site.
5. Choose the site that will require the smallest staff when the
facility is operational.
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6. Choose the site that poses the least amount of danger to workers
and people living along the transportation routes.
7. Choose the site that best complies with state and federal
environmental permit requirements, so that the agency can obtain
these permits easily and quickly.
8. Choose the site that has no demand for unique or scarce
construction resources, such as specialized labor or scarce materials.
9. Choose a site that has no competing public use.
10. Choose a site where the project can be implemented in a timely
manner--where delays will not cause the MWRA to violate the court-
ordered construction schedule.
11. Choose the site with the lowest construction costs.
12. Choose the site with the lowest operating costs.
Smith groups these objectives into the hierarchy shown in Figure 2-2.
Next, Smith asks herself if all of these objectives are really
important. In order for objectives to be included in a logical, simple, yet
comprehensive objectives hierarchy, there must be a difference in the degree
to which the objective might be achieved by at least two candidate sites. In
other words, the objectives must measure qualities that are site-specific.
The difference between sites on an objective must be significant relative to
the other differences between the sites, and the likelihood of the difference
must be large enough to justify inclusion. (Keeney, 1980).
Smith determines that three of the objectives in her hierarchy--
flexibility, staffing needs, and operating costs--are not site-specific. All
seven sites will be able to accommodate either technology, and will be able
to process fluctuating amounts of sludge. Facilities at all sites will need
the same number of staff and have the same operating costs. She also
determines that two of the elements of the reliability objective are not site-
specific. The amount of down time a facility will have and the need for
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FIGURE 2-2
FIRST VERSION OF THE OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY FOR THE TECHNICAL MODEL
Choose the most reliable site
Choose the most flexible site
Choose the site where construction
will be the easiest
Choose a site with utilities
already connected
Choose the site with the minimal
staffing requirements
Choose the safest site for workers
and residents along transportation
routes
Choose the site that best complies
Choose the "technicall with state and federal
best" site environmental permit requirements
Choose a site with no demand for
unique or scarce construction
resources
Choose a site with no competing
public use
hoose a site where implementation
can be timely
hoose the site with the lowest
construction costs
Choose the site with the lowest
operating costs
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backup processing depend on the type of facility, not on the facility site.
However, the third component of reliability--the accessibility of the site to
trucks and barges--is site-specific, so Smith decides to include the objective
"choose the site most accessible to trucks and barges" in the objectives
hierarchy.
At this stage, Smith checks to see if any of the broad objectives in
her hierarchy can be broken down into narrower objectives. One
objective--"choose the site that best complies with state and federal
environmental permit requirements" seems especially broad. What permits
must the agency obtain? What environmental safeguards must the agency
implement before it can obtain these permits? Smith determines that the
sludge treatment facility will need permits relating to air quality, surface
water, drinking water, and alteration of wetlands. In addition, environmental
permitting authorities are concerned with potential damage to threatened and
endangered species, destruction of habitats, noise impacts, and the impacts of
a facility on archaeological and historical resources. Smith adds these
considerations to the second version of the objectives hierarchy, which is
shown in Figure 2-3.
Smith is still not satisfied with her objectives hierarchy, however.
Many of the objectives seem to be interrelated and redundant. She
reexamines the objectives to see if any can be combined. She believes that
transportation reliability and safety are related--after all, the agency's real
concern with reliability of access is safety. She combines these two
objectives into one. Several objectives seem related to construction costs--
building a facility on a particular site will cost more if construction
conditions are not the best, or if utilities must be connected to the site.
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FIGURE 2-3
SECOND VERSION OF THE OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY FOR THE TECHNICAL MODEL
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Choose the
"technical
best" site
Similarly, a site's demand for unique and scarce resources affects costs.
Smith assumes that the agency will pay whatever it has to for these
resources. She combines these three objectives into the construction cost
objective. Finally, the MWRA's concern with competing public uses for sites
seems related to the timely implementation objective. If another agency
wants to use a site, the MWRA will have to negotiate with that agency or
engage in political battles to obtain the site. This could delay timely
implementation of the project. Smith combines the competing public use
objective with timely implementation. She is left with four broad objectives
for her final objectives hierarchy, shown in Figure 2-4.
Defining Attributes and Performance Measures
Next, Smith must define attributes--measures of effectiveness--for
each objective. There are two types of attributes, direct and proxy. Direct
attributes measure the degree to which an objective is achieved. (Keeney,
1980). Proxy attributes are indirect measures of an objective that cannot be
measured directly. They reflect the degree to which the unmeasurable
objective is met (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). For example, an objective in a
facility siting analysis might be "avoid damage to public health". "Public
health" is not a quality that can be measured directly. Components of it,
however, can be studied--the number of cancer deaths per year, the number
of new lung disease cases, the number of work days missed due to illness,
etc. These measures are proxy attributes for public health.
Attributes, whether direct or proxy, must be both comprehensive and
measurable. An attribute is comprehensive if by knowing its level in a
particular situation, the decision maker has a clear understanding of the
extent to which the attribute's associated objective is achieved. An
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FIGURE 2-4
FINAL OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY FOR THE TECHNICAL MODEL
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attribute is measurable if the decision maker can make probability and
preference judgments about it. (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
A site's performance on attributes can be measured using natural or
constructed scales. A natural scale is one which measures performance on an
attribute according to widely accepted measurement scales. For example,
construction costs are often measure in dollars, and the distance from a
facility to sensitive noise receptor groups is measured in feet or miles. A
constructed scale is built specifically for the decision problem being
addressed. (Keeney, 1980). It is used when no simple natural scale exists,
often because the attribute to be measured consists of several components or
is difficult to measure. An example of such an attribute is "aesthetic
impacts". No commonly accepted scales for measuring aesthetics exist, and
any that did would involve many value judgments. If a decision maker uses
constructed scales, he or she must define and explain the points on the scale
very carefully and thoroughly. (Keeney, 1980).
Smith now begins to define attributes and measurement scales for
her objectives. Her first objective is to choose the site where transportation
access is reliable and safe. She believes that there are two considerations
that go into measuring achievement of this objective--the nature of the
access roads at the site (whether they pass through residential areas, or are
commercial/industrial strips), and whether there are road geometry or other
physical problems on the access route that could increase the likelihood of
accidents. She decides to combine these two components into a proxy
attribute for reliable, safe access--"ease of access". She builds a
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constructed scale that combines the two components. The constructed scale
for this attribute is found in Table 2-1. 2
Smith's second objective is to choose a site that best complies with
state and federal environmental permit standards. She has already broken
this objective into six attributes--ecology and wetlands, surface water
bodies, ground water drinking water supplies, air quality, noise, and
archaeological resources. From the environmental reports before her, she
determines that there are four areas of concern about ecology and wetlands:
alteration of wetlands; damage to species of plants or wildlife that are
protected by state or federal statute; loss of habitats for any species--plant
or wildlife--that live on the site; and possible damage to aquatic ecology off
the site due to runoff from a compost pile or the deposition of airborne
contaminants from an incinerator.
Designing a constructed scale to measure impacts on ecology and
wetlands involves many value judgments. Smith has four types of impacts to
consider. Are they all of equal value? Is the minor alteration of wetlands
the same as no damage to endangered species, or no loss of habitat, or no
damage to off-site aquatic ecology? She balances the four types of impacts
until a scale that seems logical and fair to her is constructed. The scale is
displayed in Table 2-2.
2. All of the constructed scales measure impacts along a continuum.
Therefore, if a site's impacts are rated level 1, the fall between levels 0
and 1, if they are rated level 2, they fall between levels 1 and 2, and so
on. Where several criteria make up an impact level definition, an impact
is judged to be at a specific impact level if it satisfies one or more of
these criteria.
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TABLE 2-1
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE Xi: TRANSPORTATION ACCESS
Impact Level Impacts in the Affected Area
0 No roads used to reach site
1 Access roads lined with commercial or
industrial uses; no road geometry or
other physical problems exist
2 Access roads lined with residential
uses; no road geometry or other
physical problems exist
3 Access roads lined with residential
uses; road geometry or other physical
problems exist
- 39 -
TABLE 2-2
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X2: ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS
Impact Level Impacts in the Affected Area
0 No or minor alteration of wetlands;
no damage to species of plants or
wildlife that are of special concern',
threatened2 or endangered 2; no loss
of habitat to any on-site species, or
habitat loss that is easily replaceable
off-site3 ; no damage to off-site aquatic
ecology due to runoff or airborne
contaminants
Moderate alteration of wetlands;
damage to species of plants or wildlife
that are of special concern; habitat loss
that is moderately replaceable off-site;
impacts on off-site aquatic ecology of
local importance due to runoff or
airborne contaminants
2 Heavy alteration of wetlands;
damage to species of plants or wildlife
that are threatened or endangered;
habitat loss that has limited
replaceability off-site; impacts on
off-site aquatic ecology of regional
importance due to runoff or airborne
contaminants
I As listed by the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife
2 As listed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
3 This criterion does not mean that the agency should rebuild habitats
off-site; rather, it refers to the ease with which migrating species
can find replacement habitats off-site
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A sludge facility can have adverse impacts on surface water bodies
on or off the site, through stormwater runoff pollution from a compost pile or
the deposition of airborne contaminants from an incinerator. Because the
impacts are different for the composting and incineration technologies, Smith
develops two constructed scales to measure performance of the surface water
attribute. These simple scales, shown in Tables 2-3 and 2-4, measure
whether the potential for runoff or airborne contaminants to pollute surface
water bodies is low, moderate, or high.
Smith also needs separate scales for each technology to measure a
facility's impacts on ground water that is used or may be used for drinking
water. As with the surface water attribute, the danger from a compost pile
is that rain water might cause pollutants to run off the pile into ground
water. Airborne contaminants from incinerators may land on areas of ground
water that recharge important aquifers. The potential for pollution is
measured as either non-existent (no drinking water supplies nearby), low,
moderate, or high. The scales are found in Tables 2-5 and 2-6.
Air quality impacts are also technology-dependent. A composting
facility's major impact on air quality is the odors it produces as the sludge
decomposes. Odors are annoying only if people live nearby to smell them, so
Smith wants to determine whether odors from the facility will reach
"sensitive receptors" -- residences or institutions where people congregate.
She has her environmental engineers' predictions about how far odors will
travel from a facility on each site, and her land use planner's data about
how close any sensitive receptors are to each site. Using this information,
she can determine whether odors will impact people living near the site. She
does not need a constructed scale for this attribute; her impact assessment
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TABLE 2-3
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X3: COMPOSTING FACILITY
IMPACTS ON SURFACE WATER
Impact Level Impacts in the Affected Area
No or low potential for surface water
contamination due to stormwater runoff
Moderate potential for surface water
contamination due to stormwater runoff
High potential for surface water
contamination due to stormwater runoff
TABLE 2-4
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X3: INCINERATION FACILITY
IMPACTS ON SURFACE WATER
Impact Level Impacts in the Affected Area
No or low potential for surface water
contamination due to deposition of
airborne contaminants
Moderate potential for surface water
contamination due to deposition of
airborne contaminants
High potential for surface water
contamination due to deposition of
airborne contaminants
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0
1
2
0
1
2
TABLE 2-5
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X4: COMPOSTING FACILITY
IMPACTS ON DRINKING WATER SUPPLY
Impact Level Impacts in Affected Area
0 No potential for water supply
contamination due to facility runoff
1 Low potential for water supply
contamination due to facility runoff
2 Moderate potential for water supply
contamination due to facility runoff
3 High potential for water supply
contamination due to facility runoff
TABLE 2-6
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X4: INCINERATOR FACILITY
IMPACTS ON DRINKING WATER SUPPLY
Impact Level Impacts in Affected Area
0 No potential for deposition of airborne
contaminants on aquifer recharge areas
1 Low potential for deposition of airborne
contaminants on aquifer recharge areas
2 Moderate potential for deposition of
airborne contaminants on aquifer recharge
areas
3 High potential for deposition of airborne
contaminants on aquifer recharge areas
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for each site will be a simple "yes" or "no" answer to the question: " Will
odors reach sensitive receptors?" 3
The threat to air quality from an incinerator is the possibility that
its emissions may interact with emissions from other sources and produce air
pollution levels above those allowed by the federal Clean Air Act. Smith has
information about possible sources of emissions within three kilometers of
each site. She can use this information to answer the question: " Are there
any interaction sources near the site?"
The next environmental attribute, noise, is measured like odors, by
its impact on sensitive receptors nearby. This time, Smith does not have any
engineer's predictions about how far noise from the facility will travel. She
has a lot of measurements of current noise levels at each site, but she
decides that this Information is not useful for measuring potential impacts.
She must be satisfied with measuring noise impacts with the proxy attribute
"distance to sensitive receptors". While this attribute will not measure noise
impacts precisely (individuals tolerate noise differently; facility noise may
impact residential areas more than commercial or industrial ones), it will give
Smith a general idea about what the noise impacts will be. If noise impacts
turn out to be important to her decision, she can order further studies to
predict the level of noise the facility will produce and its more precise
impacts.
3. Smith is not totally satisfied with this measure of odor impacts. The
consultants' reports are unclear as to how the distance odors will travel
was calculated. Smith would like to obtain information on wind-scaled
distances and judgments about the number of times odors will reach
sensitive receptors--e.g., every day, once a month--in order to measure
odor impacts accurately.
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The final environmental attribute measures a facility's impacts on
archaeological and historic sites. Smith does not have a lot of information
about the presence of archaeological and historic resources on the sites.
Such information can be obtained only by expensive, time-consuming field
studies. She does, however, have a judgment from the state's historical
commission staff members that a site is located in an area of low, moderate,
or high archaeological sensitivity. For example, if archaeological artifacts
have been discovered on or near the site, or the site is located in a broader
area where many artifacts have been found, the site is rated as highly
sensitive. Smith also has information about any historic houses, buildings or
ruins located on each site. She builds a simple constructed scale (Table
2-7) combining each site's archaeological and historic sensitivity into a
ranking of low, moderate or high cultural sensitivity.
Next, Smith considers her third major objective, to choose a site
where implementation can be timely. She sees two possible technically-
related threats to timely implementation. First, many sites contain hazardous
waste, which must be cleaned up before federal and state agencies will issue
construction permits for the sludge facility. Second, if another agency wants
to use a site for a competing public purpose, the MWRA may have to
negotiate with the agency or even battle over the site, which could cause
delay. Smith designs a constructed scale that rates anticipated delays as
non-existent, minor, moderate, or major. (Table 2-8).
Finally, Smith determines how to measure each site's achievement of
her fourth major objective, low construction costs. Typically, a decision
maker would measure construction costs using a natural scale--dollars. He
or she could choose a base cost, and rank the sites according to how much
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TABLE 2-7
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X7: CULTURAL IMPACTS
Impact Level
0
Cultural Sensitivity
Low archaeological and historic
sensitivity
Moderate archaeological and historic
sensitivity
High archaeological and historic
sensitivity
1
2
TABLE 2-8
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE Xs: TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION
Impact Level
0
1
2
3
Delays Anticipated
No delays anticipated
Minor delays anticipated
Moderate delays anticipated
Major delays anticipated
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they exceed the base. Unfortunately, Smith does not have any site-specific
information about construction costs. She has data about how much it costs
to build each component of each technology, but not how much it would cost
to build each component of each technology on each site. Instead, she has
some basic information about various characteristics of each site that could
contribute to excessive construction costs. First, she has data characterizing
the geology of each site. She therefore knows whether the construction
crews will have to blast bedrock or remove ground water before beginning
construction. Either of these tasks would be expensive. Second, she knows
that some sites contain contaminated soils and water, which must be cleaned
up before construction can begin. A cleanup project could be moderate or
extensive, and would be priced accordingly. Third, she has her
transportation engineers' predictions of whether improvements would have to
be made on access routes--bridges raised, roads widened or constructed,
slopes leveled. Fourth, she knows whether or not the MWRA will have to pay
to bring sewer, water, electric and natural gas lines to the site. Finally,
she has information about whether construction of a facility at a specific
site will require scarce or unique resources, such as special blasting tools,
expensive clay to cap landfills, or skilled workers to clean up contaminated
soils.
Smith uses the information she has to construct a scale to give her
an idea about which sites might be more expensive to build on than others.
To simplify her scale, she assumes that each condition at a site causing
extra costs will cost the same. For example, cleaning up moderately
contaminated soils on a site will cost the same as making transportation
improvements on another site. She then lists the conditions that could make
costs rise (see Table 2-9). Her scale consists of a numerical score relating
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TABLE 2-9
SPECIAL CONDITIONS AT A SITE THAT COULD RAISE CONSTRUCTION COSTS
Need for blasting
Moderate soil cleanup
Extensive soil cleanup
Moderate water cleanup
Extensive water cleanup
Need for dewatering
Need for transportation improvements
Demand for unique or scarce resources
Need to install site utilities
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to how many conditions result in extra costs exist on each site. If a site
requires extensive cleanup of contaminated soils or water, that site is judged
to have two extra cost conditions (moderate cleanup plus the extra work that
is required for extensive cleanup). Thus, a site could have between 0 and 9
conditions that would increase construction costs.
Smith has now finished defining attributes and performance scales
for each objective on her hierarchy. She summarizes her work in a table
(Table 2-10), and then turns her attention to determining how each site
performs on each attribute scale.
Assessing Impacts and Probabilities
Smith now uses the consultants' and staff reports to make judgments
about how each site should be rated on each attribute scale. First, she
looks at the data about transportation access. She determines that the Deer
Island and Spectacle Island sites will fall under impact level 0, because they
are both islands, and will be accessed by barge, not truck. The Stoughton
site is rated under level 1, because it has no geometry or physical problems
and the access road is a retail--commercial highway. The Quincy site is
rated 2, because although there are no geometry problems, the access roads
go through residential areas. Both the Lynn and Walpole sites are rated at
the worst level, level 3, because their access roads go through residential
areas and are deemed to be less safe because of geometry of physical
problems. Smith decides that there are no uncertainties surrounding these
ratings. There is slight uncertainty surrounding the rating of the Wilmington
site, however. There are two possible access routes to this site, one a
commercial strip and the other a residential road. The town of Wilmington
may widen and repair the commercial strip, requiring the sludge trucks to use
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TABLE 2-10
ATTRIBUTES AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE SITING DECISION
Objective Performance Measure
Technical
1. Maximize ease of transportation access
Environmental
2. Minimize adverse ecological impacts
3. Minimize adverse impacts on surface
water bodies
4. Minimize adverse impacts on drinking
water supplies
5. Minimize adverse air quality impacts
6. Minimize noise impacts
7. Minimize adverse archaeological,
historical or cultural impacts
Institutional
8. Minimize delay of implementation
Economic
9. Minimize construction costs
Xi: Constructed scale
Xz: Constructed scale
X3: Constructed scale
X4: Constructed scale
X5: Presence of
interaction
sources
(incineration)
Will odors reach
sensitive
receptors
(composting)
Xe: Distance to sensitive
receptors (in
feet)
X7: Constructed scale
X9: Constructed scale
Xg: Constructed scale
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Performance Measure
the residential road for some time. But Smith is not sure whether the town
will perform these repairs, when it will perform them, or how long the road
construction will last. She deals with these uncertainties by assessing
probabilities for each consequence--judgments about the possibility that each
road will have to be used. She believes that it is more probable than not
that the town will repair the commercial strip, but she cannot be certain
that the probability of repair is very high. Budget constraints or new
priorities in the town might prevent the town from repairing the road. She
finally settles on a judgment that the probability that the town will not
repair the road, and that the MWRA can use the commercial strip as an
access road (impact level 1), will be 60 percent. The probability that the
sludge trucks will have to use residential roads (impact level 2) is judged to
be 40 percent.
Smith believes that the ecological impacts of building a sludge
treatment facility on each site are extremely uncertain. Site configuration
plans have not been finalized, so Smith is not certain whether construction
of the facility will alter wetlands. Some uncertainty surrounds the
assessment of whether statutorily protected species live on sites--biologists
have observed some such species on several sites in the past, but when they
returned for a more formal study, could not find evidence of habitats. It is
also not clear whether wildlife that currently lives on the sites will be able
to relocate and find new habitats off-site. Finally, Smith is not sure how
adequately the agency can prevent facility runoff or airborne contaminants
from damaging nearby aquatic ecology. She therefore must make probability
judgments about whether the impacts will fall under the different levels on
the constructed scale.
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At the Deer Island site, Smith assigns a 70 percent probability that
the impacts will be severe, level 2. The site receives such a low rating
because she does not believe that wildlife living on the site will be easily
able to migrate off the site and find new habitats. She assigns a probability
of 30 percent that the impacts will fall under level 1. The impacts on the
Lynn site are judged to be less severe--here, the only problem is that some
wetland areas may have to be altered during construction. Smith assigns a
50 percent probability that the wetlands will not have to be altered, making
the impacts fall into level 0, and a 50 percent probability that they will
have to altered, bringing the impacts down to level 1.
While looking at reports on the Quincy site, Smith notes that
although there are no threatened or endangered species on site, harbor seals
have been spotted in the river next to the site. She also notes that any
runoff from the facility would affect the Fore River salt marsh, an area of
regional ecological importance. She does not believe that the probability of
the facility damaging the seals or the salt marsh is particularly high,
however, so she assigns an 80 percent probability that the impact level will
be 0, a 10 percent probability that it will be 1 and a 10 percent probability
that it will be at the worst level, level 2.
Ecological impacts on Spectacle Island have the potential of being
the most severe among the sites. Because the site is on an island, any
small mammals living on the site will not be able to relocate, and will be
destroyed by construction. In addition, runoff from the site would flow into
the Boston Harbor. The area around the island is a fertile lobster trapping
ground. Smith judges that the probability that the impact level will be 1 is
20 percent, and that the impacts will be more severe, level 2, at 80 percent.
- 52 -
At the Stoughton site, the only ecological problem is the possible destruction
of a large wetland area. She judges that the probability that the wetlands
will be altered, making an impact level of 2, is 50 percent. There is a 50
percent probability that the impact level at the Stoughton site will be 1.
Ecological impacts at the Walpole site involve habitats that are only
moderately replaceable, and a chance that runoff will contaminate the
Neponset River, a regional resource. Smith assigns a 20 percent probability
that the impact level will be 0, a 70 percent probability that it will be 1,
and a 20 percent probability that it will be 2. At the Wilmington site,
habitats will be difficult to replace. She judges that the probability that
the impact level will be 1 is only 30 percent, but that it will be more
severe, level 2, is 70 percent.
Smith now turns to the third attribute, surface water impacts. The
constructed scale for this attribute measures a facility's potential impacts on
nearby surface water bodies such as rivers, streams and lakes. The scale
rates the potential for impacts as low (level 0), moderate (level 1) and high
(level 2). The MWRA's environmental consultants have provided Smith with
their judgments about what the potential for surface water impacts will be
from each type of facility at each site. Smith uses these expert judgments
to rank each site according to the constructed scale. At the Deer Island site,
runoff from a compost pile or airborne contaminants from an incinerator could
pollute an important surface water body, the Boston Harbor. The
environmental experts have judged the potential for such contamination to be
high. 4 Smith assigns a 90 percent probability that the impacts will be
4. As with odor impacts, Smith's information from her experts about surface
water impacts is incomplete. She has the experts' judgments that
potential for surface water contamination will be low, moderate or high,
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level 2, and a 10 percent probability that impacts will be less severe, at
level 1.
The Lynn site borders on Lynn Harbor. However, the experts have
determined that the potential for a facility to contaminate Lynn Harbor is
low to moderate. Smith thus assigns a 50 percent probability that the
impacts will be low (level 0) and a 50 percent probability that they will be
moderate (level 1). The Quincy site borders the tidal section of the
Weymouth Fore River, and there are some minor ponds and creeks within one
mile of the site, but again the experts expect only low to moderate potential
of surface water pollution. Smith uses the same probability assessments as
for the Lynn site, 50 percent.
Runoff from a compost pile or airborne contaminants from an
incinerator on Spectacle Island could pollute Boston Harbor. The experts
have informed Smith that the potential for such contamination is high. She
therefore assigns a probability of 90 percent that impacts will fall under
level 2, and only a 10 percent probability that they will be moderate, at
level 1. The Stoughton site is located near a large brook that drains into a
regionally important reservoir. Several ponds and streams are located within
one mile of the site. The experts believe that the potential for pollution of
these water bodies is moderate to high. Smith judges that the probability
that the impacts will be at level 1 is 50 percent, and that they will be at
level 2, 50 percent. Experts predict low to moderate impacts at the Walpole
site, so Smith assigns a probability of 50 percent that the impact level will
be 0 and a 50 percent probability that it will be 1. Finally, the experts
but she has no information about what factors entered into these
judgments.
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have judged that impacts at the Wilmington site, which is located near
several ponds and streams, will be moderate. Smith decides that the
probability that impacts will be at level 1 is 80 percent. She is not certain
about which direction the uncertainties will go, however--whether the
impacts could be low or high--so she creates a "buffer" of 10 percent at
level 0 and at level 2 to treat this uncertainty.
Smith uses her experts' judgments to assess probabilities for the
uncertainties surrounding the next attribute, drinking water impacts. Once
again, the experts have rated the potential that a sludge treatment facility
could pollute ground water drinking water supplies as non-existent, low,
moderate or high. Smith decides to assess different probabilities for the
composting and incineration facilities on this attribute. The measure for
incinerator impacts is whether airborne contaminants will land on aquifer
recharge areas, while the measure for composting is whether runoff will
contaminate ground water. Since airborne contaminants obviously travel
farther than runoff, Smith believes that the potential for contamination from
an incinerator will be slightly greater than that from a compost pile. She
decides to adjust her probability judgments accordingly.
The experts have judged that there is no potential for contamination
at the Deer Island, Quincy, and Spectacle Island sites. No public water
supplies exist within one mile of each of these sites. Development of future
water supplies at or near these sites is infeasible. They are all located
near low yield aquifers, and since they are all coastal or island sites, salt
water intrusion would ruin any ground water's drinking potential. However,
Smith is not certain about these predictions--techniques could be developed
to prevent salt water intrusion if new water supplies were desperately
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needed. She therefore assigns a probability of 90 percent that the impact
level of a compost pile at these sites will be 0, and protects herself by
judging that there is a 10 percent chance that the impacts could be
somewhat adverse, at level 1. She judges that the probability that airborne
contaminants from a incinerator would have low impacts on drinking water to
be 20 percent, and that they would have no impacts at all to be 80
percent.
The engineers have told Smith that the potential for drinking water
contamination from a facility at the Lynn, Walpole and Wilmington sites will
be low. Using the "buffer" technique she used for her surface water
probability assessments, she judges that the probability that the impacts
from a composting facility at these sites will be non-existent (level 0) is 10
percent, that they will be low (level 1) is 80 percent, and that they will be
moderate (level 2) is 10 percent. She believes the impacts from an
incinerator will be a little more severe, however, and assigns the probability
that impacts will be level 0 as 10 percent, level 1 as 70 percent, and level
2 as 20 percent for the Lynn and Walpole sites. The Wilmington site is
located near several high aquifer areas, and although runoff from a compost
pile would not affect these resources, airborne contaminants from an
incinerator might reach them. Smith believes that the probability that
impacts from an incinerator in Wilmington would be low (level 1) are 10
percent, moderate (level 2), 70 percent, and high (level 3), 20 percent.
The Stoughton site is located near several public wells and a major
drinking water supply, the Brockton Reservoir. The experts have judged that
the potential for contamination of these resources from a composting facility
or an incinerator is moderate to high. Smith thus assigns a probability of 50
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percent that impacts will be moderate, at level 2, and a 50 percent
probability that they will be high, at level 3, for both technologies.
Air quality impacts (attribute five) are assessed very differently for
the two technologies. First, Smith looks at the air quality impacts from an
incinerator. As explained above, she measures these impacts by asking
whether an interaction source exists near the site. The staff reports show
that interaction sources exist near the Deer Island and Lynn sites. No
interaction sources exist near the Spectacle Island, Stoughton, Walpole, or
Wilmington sites. Some uncertainty surrounds the Quincy site. Right now, no
interaction sources exist, but a hazardous waste incinerator and an electrical
plant are proposed to be built in the area within the next five years. Smith
assigns a "no" score to Quincy, and decides to change this judgment during
her sensitivity analysis of the model results, to see if the presence of these
interaction sources might change the results.
To measure air quality impacts of a composting facility, Smith uses
information from the staff reports that judge how far the odors will travel
from a composting facility on each site. Unfortunately, she has no
information for Deer Island, Lynn and Walpole sites. She decides to calculate
her own estimates of these measures. She finds the mean distance and the
standard deviation for the remaining sites, and assigns a range of one
standard deviation either way for the unknown sites. She then compares
these measurements with information about how far away the nearest
sensitive receptors are from the site. These comparisons are shown in Table
2-11. She determines that there will be no odor impacts at the Deer Island
or Spectacle Island sites, but that odors will reach sensitive receptors at the
Lynn, Quincy, Stoughton, Walpole and Wilmington sites. The Lynn and
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TABLE 2-11
CALCULATION OF ODOR IMPACTS
Site
Deer Island
Lynn
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Stoughton
Walpole
Wilmington
Distance
Odors Will
Travel
734--2217*
734--2217*
656--984
1640
656--984
734--2217*
2624
Distance to
Nearest Sensitive
Receptor
5280
2000
500
4000
800
500
1000
Odors
Will
Impact
Sensitive
Receptor
No
Yes**
Yes
No
Yes**
Yes
Yes
* Estimate based on mean distance at other sites plus or minus one
standard deviation
** Uncertain because of range
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Stoughton results are uncertain, however, because the range of impacts was
estimated. Smith makes a note to perform sensitivity analysis on these
results after the model is completed.
Attribute number six, noise impacts, is measured in much the same
way as odor impacts. Here, Smith simply uses the distance from the site to
the nearest sensitive receptor. The measurements for each site are found in
Table 2-12. The seventh attribute, cultural impacts, is measured using a
constructed scale. Smith has judgments from staff members of the state's
historical commission about whether each site's archaeological and historical
sensitivity is low, moderate or high. She uses these judgments in her model.
At Deer Island, archaeological sensitivity is judged to be low because the
site has been highly disturbed by construction. However, there are remains
of an old fort on the site. Smith judges that the probability that the
facility's impacts on cultural resources will be low is 50 percent, and that
they will be moderate is 50 percent.
The Lynn site has low archaeological sensitivity because it is a
filled-in portion of Lynn Harbor. Smith sees no uncertainties with this site,
and assigns it a score of 0 (low sensitivity). The Quincy site also has low
archaeological sensitivity, but portions of the shipyard might have historical
significance. She assigns a 50 percent probability that the facility's impacts
will be at level 0 and 50 percent that they will be at level 1 (moderate).
Cultural impacts will be high at the Spectacle Island site. An archaeological
site has already been discovered on the island. Smith rates Spectacle Island
at level 2. The Stoughton site is located in an area of moderate
archaeological sensitivity, so Smith scores it at level 1. The Walpole site is
judged to be of high archaeological sensitivity by the experts, and also
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TABLE 2-12
DISTANCE FROM SITE TO SENSITIVE NOISE RECEPTORS
Site Distance to Sensitive Receptors (in feet)
Deer Island 5280
Lynn 2000
Quincy 500
Spectacle Island 4000
Stoughton 800
Walpole 500
Wilmington 1000
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contains an historic mansion eligible for the National Register of Historic
Places. Smith therefore judges that the impact level for Walpole will be 2.
The impacts at the Wilmington site are uncertain. No archaeological artifacts
have been found on the site itself, but the site is located in an area that
was a core of prehistoric activity. Twenty-four prehistoric sites have been
found in close proximity to the site. Smith judges that the probability that
impacts will be moderate (level 1) is 30 percent, and that the probability
that they will be high (level 2), is 70 percent.
Two elements are analyzed in the constructed scale for attribute
eight, timely implementation. First, Smith judges that permitting for the
Quincy, Lynn and Spectacle Island sites could take longer than that for the
rest of the sites because these sites are contaminated by hazardous waste.
The agency will have to clean up these sites before permits will be issued.
Second, she judges that Spectacle Island might involve delays because of
competing public uses. The state's Secretary of Transportation has proposed
using the island as a dump for fill from a new highway construction project.
The president of the State Senate has proposed making the island a harbor
park. If the MWRA has to negotiate over the use of this site, or coordinate
its use with other agencies, the project schedule could be delayed. Smith
believes that there is a 90 percent chance that the Lynn site could involve
minor delays (level 1 on the scale) and a 10 percent chance that delays
could be moderate. At the Quincy site, she judges that the probability that
delays would be minor is 80 percent, while the probability that they would
be moderate Is 20 percent. Because the Spectacle Island site involves both
permitting problems and competing uses, she assigns a probability of 50
percent that delays will be moderate and a probability of 50 percent that
delays will be major.
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Finally, Smith rates each site on its performance on the last
attribute, construction costs. She studies the technical reports to determine
whether the sites have any of the nine special conditions that could raise
construction costs. Construction at the Deer Island site would require
blasting, moderate soil cleanup, moderate water cleanup, and dewatering.
Because all construction materials, personnel and equipment would have to be
barged to the site, Deer Island also demands unique or scarce resources (the
barges).
Construction at the Lynn site would require blasting and dewatering.
Transportation improvements would have to be made--a new pier built if
access was to' be by barge, new roads built if access would be by truck. The
project would require large amounts of clay to cap a landfill currently on the
site. Because many construction projects are planned for the Boston area in
the next ten years, clay will be a scarce resource. The soil at the Lynn
site is contaminated, and will require at least a moderate cleanup, and
perhaps an extensive one. Finally, sewer services might have to be built at
the site if the MWRA is not able to hook up to the Lynn sewage treatment
plant. This plant is currently being upgraded for secondary treatment, and
there is some uncertainty whether it will have the capacity to handle sewage
from the sludge treatment plant.
The Quincy site is heavily polluted with hazardous waste, and will
require extensive soil cleanup and moderate water cleanup. Unique
resources--personnel trained in handling hazardous waste--will be required
for this project. In addition, construction at the site will require dewatering.
Spectacle Island has many of the special conditions that raise costs
because it is an undeveloped island. The MWRA must build piers so that
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barges can bring the sludge back and forth. All site utilities must be
constructed on the island. Extensive dewatering will be required. The
island is contaminated, and will require moderate soil and water cleanups.
Construction on the island will also demand unique or scarce resources--
barges to transport personnel, equipment and materials; clay to cap the trash
landfills on the site; and a disposal site for material that is dredged to build
piers.
Construction at the Stoughton site will require blasting and
dewatering. The MWRA must regrade an access road before its trucks can
safely use it. The site may be contaminated, and could require moderate soil
and water cleanups. It is not clear whether the MWRA will be able to hook
up to the local sewer lines. The MWRA must regrade a road and alter
bridges near the Walpole site before construction can begin there. In
addition, it is uncertain whether the agency will be able to use local sewers.
At the Wilmington site, blasting and dewatering must be performed before
construction, and a bridge built across wetland areas. The local sewer
situation is also unclear here.
Smith summarizes the information about costs in a table (Table
2-13). She also includes probability judgments for those sites where the
number of special conditions is uncertain.
Assessing Preferences
Now that Smith has expected value for the impacts at each site,
she must find a common unit by which to compare them. Decision analysis
uses utility measures--measures of the strength of preference or desirability
of various impact levels. A separate utility function is assessed for each
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TABLE 2-13
SPECIAL CONDITIONS THAT COULD RAISE CONSTRUCTION COSTS--BY SITE
Deer Island 5
Blasting '
Moderate soil cleanup
Moderate water cleanup
Dewatering
Unique or scarce resources
Lynn 6 (.6)' 7 (.3) 8 (.1) Probability
Blasting * Uncertainty
Moderate soil cleanup
Extensive soil cleanup*
Moderate water cleanup
Dewatering
Transportation improvements
Unique or scarce resources
Site utilities"
Quincy 5
Moderate soil cleanup
Extensive soil cleanup
Moderate water cleanup
Dewatering
Unique or scarce resources
Spectacle Island 6
Moderate soil cleanup
Moderate water cleanup
Dewatering
Transportation improvements
Unique or scarce resources
Site utilities
Stoughton 3 (.5) 4 (.2) 5 (.2) 6 (.1)
Blasting
Moderate soil cleanup**
Moderate water cleanup"
Dewatering
Transportation improvements
Site utilities"
Walpole 1 (.7) 2 (.3)
Transportation improvements
Site utilities"
Wilmington 3 (.7) 4 (.3)
Blasting
Dewatering
Transportation improvements
Site utilities"
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attribute. Smith assesses her utility function for the first attribute--
transportation access--as follows: first, she defines the extreme values that
impacts can have. The worst transportation access impact is at level 3 of
the constructed scale. The best impact is no impact--level 0 of the scale.
She sets her utility for the worst impact at 0 and at 1 for the best impact.
Next, she constructs a series of "gambles"--hypothetical lotteries that can
help her judge her preferences. In the first gamble, she asks herself, "What
impact level of this attribute would I find exactly as desirable as a lottery
that gives me a 50 percent chance that impacts will be at their worst and a
50 percent chance that impacts will be at their best?" After much
deliberation, she decides that impacts at level 2 would render her
"indifferent" to the lottery. In the second gamble, she now asks, "What
impact level would I find exactly as desirable as a lottery that gives me a
50 percent chance that impacts will be at level 2 and a 50 percent chance
that impacts will be at their best?" She determines that impacts at level 1
would make her indifferent to the lottery. Finally, she asks herself, "What
impact level would I find exactly as desirable as a lottery that gives me a
50 percent chance that impacts will be at level 2 and a 50 percent chance
that impacts will be at their worst?" She decides that impacts that fall a
little more than halfway between levels 2 and 3 would make her indifferent
to this lottery.
Smith now has five points that she can graph to create a utility
function. Her points are shown in Figure 2-5. She draws a curve through
the points, and adjusts it so that the values between the points reflect her
preferences. Smith repeats this procedure for each attribute. Her final
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FIGURE 2-5
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utility assessments are displayed in Figure 2-6. 5 The shapes of the curves
reveal Smith's attitudes for risk on each attribute. She is "risk-averse" on
the transportation access, ecology and wetlands, surface water, drinking
water, timely implementation and construction cost attributes. Her utilities
show that she is unwilling to take risks on these attributes--if given a
choice between a lottery offering a 50 percent chance that impacts will be at
their best and a 50 percent chance that they will be at their worst and a
certain impact, Smith prefers the certainty, not the gamble. She is "risk-
neutral" on the noise and cultural resources attributes, meaning she is
indifferent between a gamble and a certainty. Smith does not need to assess
a utility function for the air quality attribute. If odors will reach sensitive
receptors or interaction sources exist near the site, the utility is 0. If
these conditions are not present at the site, the utility is 1.
Next, Smith calculates an expected utility for each attribute by
multiplying the probability of occurrence of each impact level by the utility
for that level. The resulting expected utilities for each level within an
5. In order to simplify her models, Smith makes an assumption of additive
utility independence among the attributes. Under this condition, a
decision maker would be indifferent to the following lotteries:
Os (b)YS )O
The decision maker's preference between levels of attribute X is not
related to the level of attribute Y. If the attributes are additive utility
independent, Smith can simply add the weighted expected utilities for all
attributes to obtain a measure for each site. Smith assumes additive
utility independence for all of the models she uses.
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attribute are added together to produce an expected utility for that
attribute. These are displayed in Table 2-14.
Making Tradeoffs among Objectives
Smith has expected utility assessments for each site over nine
attributes. Before she can combine this data into final utility rankings for
each site, however, she must weight the attributes. She is not equally
concerned about all of the attributes. To find which are more important
than others, she asks herself, "If all the attributes are at their worst levels,
which one would I want to bring to its best level?" She decides that
attribute 8, timely implementation, is the most important. She continues this
line of questioning and comes up with the following ranking of attributes:
Timely implementation
Construction costs
Drinking water
Air quality
Noise
Transportation access
Surface water
Ecology
Cultural resources
She then assesses what tradeoffs she would make against the
highest ranking attribute to bring the other attributes to their best levels.
Figure 2-7 shows Smith's value tradeoffs. The first graph illustrates the
tradeoff she would make between the most heavily weighted attribute, timely
implementation, and the second most heavily weighted attribute, construction
costs. The graph shows that Smith is willing to incur an increase in delays
from between minor and moderate to major in order to move construction
costs from their worst to their best level. On the other hand, the last graph
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shows that she is willing to incur only very minor additional delays in order
to move cultural impacts from their worst to their best.
Results and Conclusions
Smith uses these tradeoff judgments to calculate a weight for each
attribute. She then calculates a utility score for each site by multiplying
the expected utility of each attribute by the attribute weight, and adding up
the weighted utilities for all nine attributes. These values are then entered
into the decision tree, and an expected utility for each site is calculated.
Figure 2-8 shows the final results. Deer Island has the highest utility
score, followed by Quincy, Wilmington, Walpole and Spectacle Island. The
range of scores is displayed in Figure 2-9.
Before Smith determines what she has learned from this model, she
performs sensitivity analysis to see whether changing some of her
assumptions and judgments change the results of the model. She had
originally assumed that there was a 50/50 chance that either technology
would have to be used. She changes the tree model to see if certainty about
either technology would change her decision about a site. The result, shown
in Table 2-15, shows that if composting is the certain technology, Deer
Island and Quincy remain the top two choices, but Spectacle Island and Lynn
move to third and fourth place, respectively, above Wilmington and Walpole.
If incineration is the certain technology, Deer Island, Quincy and Wilmington
are still the top three sites, but Quincy is now first, Wilmington second, and
Deer Island third. Walpole remains in fourth place.
Smith remembers that she was very unsure about the air quality
impact of a composting facility at several sites because, due to lack of
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FIGURE 2-8
DECISION TREE SHOWING RESULTS OF THE TECHNICAL MODEL
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TABLE 2-15
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY OUTCOME
Model Results at
50 Percent Chance
of Either Outcome
Deer Island
Quincy
Wilmington
Walpole
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Stoughton
Model Results at
100 Percent Chance
of Composting
.7404
.6965
.6453
.6273
.6060
.5957
.5786
Deer Island
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Wilmington
Walpole
Stoughton
Model Results at
100 Percent Chance
of Incineration
.7964
.6414
.6064
.5971
.5911
.5731
.5230
Quincy
Wilmington
Deer Island
Walpole
Stoughton
Spectacle Island
Lynn
.7516
.6453
.6843
.6814
.6341
.6055
.5943
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information, she had to estimate the distance that odors would travel. When
she changes the impact assessments for these sites, both Lynn and Stoughton
move up in the rankings, Lynn to third place behind Quincy, Stoughton to
fifth place behind Wilmington. Smith decides that it might be worthwhile to
get more information about the odor impacts before she eliminates Lynn and
Stoughton from further consideration.
Smith also remembers that there was some uncertainty as to whether
interaction sources would be built near the Quincy site. When she changes
the value associated with incineration at Quincy, Quincy drops to third place
in the final rankings behind Wilmington. Smith is also interested in the
uncertainties surrounding Spectacle Island on the attribute of timely
implementation. When she runs the model again assuming that there will be
no delays, Spectacle Island moves to third place behind Deer Island and
Quincy and above Wilmington and Walpole.
Smith is surprised by some of the technical model's results. She
had expected the Lynn and Spectacle Island sites to have higher rankings.
After all, the Lynn site is located in an area already used for industry; and
many members of the legislature, press and environmental community have
been pushing Spectacle Island as the perfect site. When she examines the
model structure carefully, she finds that her three most heavily weighted
attributes, timely implementation, costs and drinking water, account for 45
percent of a site's final score because of the tradeoffs she made. The Lynn
site had high costs and the possibility of delay. Both costs and delay were
related to the presence of hazardous waste on the site. Spectacle Island
scored well on air quality, noise, transportation access, and drinking water
attributes, but poorly on timely implementation and costs. Deer Island, on
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the other hand, ranked first because although constructions costs were high,
no delays were expected and no impact on drinking water was likely. Deer
Island also scored highly on other heavily weighted attributes such as air
quality, noise, and transportation access. These high scores were enough to
allow Deer Island to overcome its low rating on the construction cost
attribute.
What has Smith learned from this first cut at the sludge facility
siting problem? First, she sees that timely implementation and costs are
extremely important to her. She is not willing to change the weights of
these attributes even though they appear to "run" the model. She has also
learned that her decision, if made on technical grounds, is not really
affected by the outcome of the technology uncertainty. True, Spectacle
Island dominates Wilmington if composting is the technology, but the utilities
are not all that different between the two sites (.6064 for Spectacle Island
and .5911 for Wilmington). Resolving the uncertainties around transportation
access at the Wilmington site in favor of the commercial/industrial access
road alternative would be more than enough to allow Wilmington to dominate
Spectacle Island in the ranking (Wilmington's new score would be .6300 in
this case). Based on the technical model, she tentatively decides to eliminate
Walpole and Spectacle Island from further study, to obtain more information
on the odor impacts at Lynn and Stoughton, and to retain Deer Island,
Quincy, and Wilmington for further consideration.
- 77 -
THE POLITICAL MODEL
Despite the extensive analysis she put into the technical model,
Smith is not satisfied with the results. She realizes that technical
considerations are only one dimension of the sludge facility siting problem.
She decides to take another cut at formulating the problem, this time as a
political problem.
In the political model, the processing technology is not considered
as important as in the technical model. Smith believes that political
considerations will not be related to technology, but instead to the fact that
any type of facility will be placed on a certain site. She defines her new
decision problem using a simple decision tree, shown in Figure 3-1.
Structuring Objectives for the Decision
Next, Smith turns her attention to defining objectives for the siting
decision. What are her political objectives? She decides that her primary
objective is to build a sludge treatment facility as quickly as possible to
meet the court-ordered schedule. Other political objectives, such as using
her political "capital" wisely and advancing her own career, are related to
the major objective of timely implementation. She decides to build her
political model around this one objective.
Defining Attributes and Performance Measures
Smith sees five considerations that could delay project
implementation. First, she could choose a site that has a powerful political
"sponsor"--someone who represents the potential host community in the state
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FIGURE 3-1
DECISION TREE STRUCTURE FOR THE POLITICAL MODEL
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legislature, and has a lot of political clout; or a powerful politician who is
interested in protecting the site from a sludge facility for some other reason.
Second, she could choose a site in a community where abutters could easily
organize to sue, put pressure on politicians, or protest the siting choice.
Third, she could choose a site that public sentiment believes should not be
chosen--for example, she could choose a site in a community that already
hosts many regional facilities. Public outcry could delay the siting. Fourth,
she could choose a site that has been proposed for a competing public use.
If she had to play a lot of political games with other agency heads or
politicians to get control of the site, project implementation could be delayed.
Finally, she could choose a site that must be approved by the legislature.
Under the MWRA's enabling legislation, the agency must go to the legislature
to get eminent domain authority to take privately owned land. If the agency
chooses a site that it already controls, or is already controlled by the state,
legislative approval would not be necessary.
Smith decides to use these five considerations as attributes to
measure each site's performance on her major objective, timely
implementation. What kind of scale should she use to measure these
attributes? Obviously, no natural scales to measure political power or the
possibility of protest exist. She decides to build five similar constructed
scales, each with two levels corresponding to presence of the condition or
absence of the condition. Because uncertainties surround some of the
attributes, these scales will be continuous, not discrete--a site's performance
on an attribute could fall between the two levels. The five scales are
described in Table 3-1.
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TABLE 3-1
CONSTRUCTED SCALES FOR POLITICAL MODEL ATTRIBUTES
Xi: POLITICAL SPONSOR
Impact Level Political Situation
0 No sponsor, or sponsor will not use powe
1
X2: POWER OF ABUTTERS
Impact Level
0
1
Xa: PUBLIC SENTIMENT
Impact Level
0
1
X4: COMPETING PUBLIC USE
Impact Level
0
1
X5: LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL
Impact Level
0
1
to stop choice of site
Sponsor will use power to stop choice of
site
r
Political Situation
Abutters unable to organize to delay
Abutters able to organize and obtain
resources to delay implementation
Political Situation
No general public sentiment against using
this site for a facility
General public sentiment against using
this site could delay implementation
Political Situation
No competing public use for the site
Competing public use could delay
implementation
Political Situation
Legislative approval not needed to acquire
site
Gaining legislative approval could delay
implementation
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Assessing Impacts and Probabilities
Smith is now ready to assess how each site will perform on each
attribute. Deer Island does not have a politically powerful sponsor.
However, Smith judges that abutters to the site are able to organize to
delay. The people of Winthrop have long protested the presence of Logan
Airport, a prison, and the primary and secondary sewage treatment plants
near their community. Community groups are entrenched, powerful, and well-
funded. Smith believes that there is a 90 percent probability that Deer
Island's abutters would be able to delay implementation. Because Winthrop
already experiences the impacts of other regional facilities, Smith believes
that general public sentiment might be opposed to siting sludge treatment
facilities on Deer Island. She assesses a 50 percent probability that public
sentiment against the site could delay implementation. There is no
competing public use for the site. Finally, legislative approval is not
needed, since the MWRA already owns Deer Island.
The site in Lynn does not have a politically powerful sponsor who
could delay implementation. Abutters are unorganized, because Lynn does
not host any regional burdens, and the people have little experience with
organizing. Smith judges the probability that abutters could delay
implementation to be 20 percent. It is likely that general public sentiment
would oppose siting the sludge facility in Lynn, however, because Lynn is
not part of the MWRA service district. Smith believes that there is strong
public concern that wastes should be kept within the boundaries of the
region that produces them. She judges that there is a 70 percent probability
that public sentiment could delay implementation. There is no competing use
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for the Lynn site. Legislative approval would be needed to acquire this site,
since it is privately owned.
The Quincy site does not have a politically powerful sponsor.
Abutters are judged able to organize and delay, however, because the MWRA
has already purchased the Quincy site for a transfer and staging facility,
and has sited an interim sludge treatment facility there. The people of
Quincy opposed these projects, and they are organized, well-funded and
angry. Smith believes there is a 70 percent chance that abutters could
delay implementation of construction of a sludge treatment facility on the
Quincy site. Although abutters might be opposed to the facility, Smith does
not believe that there is general public sentiment against the site. There is
no competing use for the site, and legislative approval is not needed because
the MWRA already owns the site.
Spectacle Island is sponsored by a very powerful politician. The
president of the State Senate has announced his support for developing the
island into a harbor park. Smith believes that there is a 80 percent chance
that he will use his power to delay implementation if she should choose
Spectacle Island as the site of the sludge treatment facility. Because the
site is an island, there are no real "abutters" to the site; for purposes of
her analysis, Smith assumes that the people living in the harbor areas of the
city of Boston are abutters to Spectacle Island. She believes that there is a
10 percent chance that these people could organize and delay implementation.
No public sentiment against using the site is expected; in fact, there is much
public support for choosing Spectacle Island. There is a competing public use
for the site, however. The state's Secretary of Transportation has proposed
using the island as a disposal site for fill from the Central Artery
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reconstruction project. Smith judges that the probability that the Secretary
could delay implementation of the sludge facility construction if she chooses
Spectacle Island to be 90 percent. Legislative approval is necessary to buy
portions of this site from the city of Boston.
The three inland sites, Stoughton, Walpole and Wilmington, all have
the same political characteristics. None of them are sponsored by politically
powerful figures. The abutters in these communities are not judged easily
able to organize and delay the project schedule. Smith believes that the
probability of delay from abutters' opposition is 20 percent. There is no
public sentiment against siting sludge treatment facilities in any of these
communities. No competing uses exist for these sites, and legislative
approval is required for all three, since they are privately owned. Smith
summarizes her impact and probability assessments for all of the sites in
Table 3-2.
Assessing Preferences
Next, Smith assesses her preferences for levels of each attribute.
Her utility functions are shown in Figure 3-2. Smith is risk-averse on the
attributes of politically powerful sponsor, abutters' opposition, and competing
public uses. Her utility functions show that she is risk-prone (preferring a
gamble to a certainty) on the public sentiment and legislative approval
attributes.
Making Tradeoffs among Objectives
Smith now considers how to weight the five attributes. Which is
more important--avoiding a battle with a politically powerful sponsor, or
avoiding the need for legislative approval? She believes that tangling with
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a powerful political sponsor could cause a great deal of delay, so she weights
this attribute most heavily. Next, she believes that abutters' opposition can
cause serious delays, so she will weight that attribute second most heavily.
Of the remaining three attributes, she judges competing public uses to be
most important; of the last two attributes, legislative approval and public
sentiment, she judges that she would prefer to bring legislative approval to
its best level. Smith then makes the value tradeoffs shown in Figure 3-3.
The graphs show that she Is willing to incur quite a bit of delay from a
sponsor in order to eliminate opposition from abutters and competing public
uses. She is less willing to take on a powerful political figure, however, to
better the legislative approval and public sentiment attributes.
Results and Conclusions
Smith now feeds the impact, probability and utility assessments and
the value tradeoff data into a multiattribute utility function. The results
are as follows:
Site Utility
Stoughton .9496
Walpole .9496
Wilmington .9496
Quincy .8211
Lynn .7390
Deer Island .7307
Spectacle Island .3863
The three inland sites share first place. Spectacle Island, the site with the
most political complications, ranks last. The range of results is illustrated
in Figure 3-4.
Smith is uncertain about some of the assumptions she made in
evaluating the sites. Suppose a past history of being able to organize is not
a good indicator of whether a community will organize against a sludge
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FIGURE 3-3
SMITH'S VALUE TRADEOFFS FOR ALL ATTRIBUTES
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facility? She recalculates the model, this time assuming that there is a 90
percent probability that abutters in each community will delay project
construction. She obtains the following results:
Site Utility
Stoughton .7697
Walpole .7697
Wilmington .7697
Quincy .7697
Deer Island .7307
Lynn .5591
Spectacle Island .1807
This time, Quincy joins the inland sites at the top of the ranking. Spectacle
Island remains at the bottom of the list. The range of results is shown in
Figure 3-5.
Smith next tries to see if any changes in her probability
assessments can move the Spectacle Island site up in the list. She assumes
a "best case" scenario-- the site's sponsor decides not to use his power to
delay project implementation, and the Secretary of Transportation finds
another site for his fill. There is a 10 percent probability that abutters will
delay the project. Under this scenario, the total utility for Spectacle Island
becomes .8193, and it moves above Lynn and Deer Island the ranking. If
only one of the two most heavily weighted attributes changes, however,
Spectacle Island remains at the bottom of the list. If the sponsor declines to
use his power to block implementation, but the competing use remains, the
site's total utility is .5683. If the sponsor will delay implementation, but
the competing use disappears, the score is .5593.
What has Smith learned from building this model? First, her choice
of three sites for further study is not really sensitive to her judgments
about whether abutters will delay implementation of the project. If she
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downplays the probability that abutters will delay, she should choose
Stoughton, Walpole and Wilmington for further study. If she judges that
abutters at all sites can delay implementation, her choice remains the same,
but she can add Quincy to the list.
Second, Smith has learned that she should not expend political
capital and energy to negotiate with the Senate President or the Secretary of
Transportation over Spectacle Island. Even in a "best case" scenario, with
the president agreeing to drop his opposition to the site and the Secretary
considering another site for fill, four sites have higher utilities than
Spectacle Island.
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THE NEGOTIATION MODEL
Smith has learned a lot about her problem from the technical and
political models, but she does not feel that these models have dealt with the
problem comprehensively. The models have not really treated the sludge
facility's potential impacts on people, and Smith believes that concern over
these impacts are what the "not in my backyard" syndrome is all about. She
finds the negotiation theories of facility siting attractive, and decides to
build a model based on the views and inputs of the different social
groups- -"stakeholders"- -interested in the project.
There are several ways Smith can go about using stakeholder group
inputs in her model. First, she can act as a "Supra-Decision Maker" (Keeney
and Raiffa, 1976). Under this theory, a single decision maker incorporates or
reflects the probability judgments and preferences of the various stakeholder
into his or her own beliefs. For example, the decision maker could have an
attribute in his or her personal model called "satisfy the preferences of
group X", and could measure a site's performance in satisfying these
preferences. Second, Smith could build a totally negotiated model--she could
sit down with stakeholders and negotiate until the group reached consensual
definitions of objectives, attributes, performance measures, probabilities,
preferences, and value tradeoffs for the model. (Von Winterfeldt and Rios,
1980). Finally, Smith could negotiate a consensual objectives hierarchy with
stakeholder groups. (Edwards and Von Winterfeldt, 1987). She could then
use the information about each group's objectives to establish better lines of
communication with the stakeholders; to decide where to seek more
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information about impacts; and to possibly modify the design of the facility.
(Keeney, 1988).
Smith is intrigued by the second strategy- -building a consensual
model--but she does not think she has the time to engage in detailed
negotiations with stakeholder groups. Also, because she is just trying to
learn about the nature of the problem from this modeling exercise, she does
not want to become involved in a process that could require her to make
commitments to a strategy. If she negotiated model-building with
stakeholder groups, she might have to make promises and commit to a
negotiation and compensation strategy before she has determined the nature
of the problem.
She decides to use the last technique, building a common objectives
hierarchy. She will identify stakeholder groups, and hold informal
conversations with them about the sludge facility siting problem. She will
then try to identify their major objectives, and incorporate these into a
shared objectives hierarchy. After that, she will use the information gleaned
from her discussions to design a model based on a hypothetical negotiation,
in which she tries to guess how each group would measure performance on
each objective, how it would assess the probabilities of impacts, what its
preferences for impact levels would be, and what tradeoffs it would make
among objectives. She will then build a model and produce a ranking of
sites for each group. She can see if the results show any agreement on
particular sites. Although the models will be hypothetical, based on her
guesses about how stakeholders think and what they value, she believes that
the exercise will be useful in highlighting sources of agreement and
disagreement. If she eventually decides to use a negotiation strategy, she
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can engage in further discussions with the stakeholder groups to verify or
change her inputs to the model.
Smith believes that the technology used at the sludge facility will
be very important to the stakeholder groups. She constructs a decision tree
(Figure 4-1) to represent the problem.
Identifying Stakeholder Groups
First, Smith tried to identify the groups that are affected by the
sludge facility siting decision. The most obvious group are the people -who
live near each candidate sites--the abutters. Smith has a problem--who
should she talk to as a representative of these groups? In some
communities, notably Winthrop and Quincy, neighborhood groups have already
been formed to protest other facilities. However, in many instances, abutters
are not organized into a formal group. The MWRA has held several hearings
in each community, and developed mailing lists of people who have attended
these meetings. In addition, the agency has received many letters from
people in the community. Smith uses this information to pick a group of five
people (those who have attended and spoken at the most meetings, and who
have written the most letters) she judges to be leaders of each neighborhood.
The second most obvious group of stakeholders are the local
officials representing each town--mayors, members of boards of selectmen,
planning board members, etc. Smith believes that this group may have
slightly different interests than abutters. While abutters are most concerned
with the immediate physical impacts of the facility, local officials will also
be concerned about how a facility would impact the town as a whole--
physically, fiscally, and socioeconomically. Smith assembles a group
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FIGURE 4-1
DECISION TREE STRUCTURE FOR THE NEGOTIATION MODEL
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consisting of the mayor, chairman of the board of selectmen or city council,
and chairman of the planning board from each town to represent local
officials.
Next, Smith decides to include environmentalists among the
stakeholder groups. She believes that there are two types of environmental
groups--groups whose primary interest is the cleanup of Boston Harbor, and
groups who are more interested in impacts on local environments. She
therefore includes two environmental stakeholder groups--harbor
environmental groups and local environmental groups. The harbor group
consists of representatives of statewide environmental organizations such as
the Massachusetts Audubon Society, the Conservation Law Foundation, and
Save the Harbor, Save the Bay--all who are interested in Boston Harbor.
The local group consists of representatives of smaller groups whose chief
concern is local air and water pollution, damage to wetlands and local
ecology (whether or not of statewide importance), and impacts on
archaeological and historical resources. Smith also includes state and federal
environmental regulators as stakeholders in the sludge facility siting
decision.
Finally, Smith identifies the MWRA itself and its ratepayers as two
separate stakeholder groups. The MWRA has an interest in siting a facility
that is technically reliable and environmentally sound. The ratepayers, who
will have to pay for the entire harbor cleanup project, have an interest in
keeping sludge facility construction costs low. Smith decides to act as the
representative of the MWRA; and to use members of the agency's advisory
board, made up of representatives of every city and town in the district, as
representatives of the ratepayers.
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Structuring a Common Objectives Hierarchy
After identifying each stakeholder group and its representatives,
Smith holds a series of informal conversations with each group. In these
conversations, she tries to understand what objectives each group has for
the siting decision, how they would measure performance on each of these
objectives, and generally, what their preferences and tradeoffs would be. She
does not try to get precise assessments in these conversations; rather, she
tries to get a general idea of each groups feelings and beliefs about the
siting problem.
First, Smith lists the MWRA's objectives for the siting problem. She
believes that the agency is interested in transportation reliability,
transportation safety, timely implementation, construction costs, and
operating costs. The ratepayers are primarily interested in keeping
construction and operating costs low. From her conversations with
environmental groups interested in the harbor, she judges that they are
concerned with timely implementation of the harbor cleanup, protecting
marine ecology and wetlands, and minimizing impacts of marine water
resources. Environmental groups more interested in local issues, however,
care about protecting local ecology and wetlands, minimizing damage to local
surface and ground water resources, preventing air pollution, and avoiding
damage to local archaeological and historic resources.
While reviewing her conversations with abutters and local officials
from each of the seven communities, Smith discovers that the seven groups
of abutters have similar interests, and that the seven groups of local
officials have similar interests. In order to simplify her model, she decides
to aggregate these 14 separate groups into two groups, abutters and local
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officials. Abutters are most interested in transportation safety, protection of
surface and ground water resources (particularly those used for drinking
water), air quality, and minimizing- noise impacts. They are also interested
in any visual impacts the facility might have--how it will look, and whether
it will blend into the neighborhood or be an eyesore. Abutters are also
concerned about the socioeconomic impacts of the facility--whether local
property values will decline, if the facility will fit into the general
neighborhood character, and whether the MWRA's use of the site will prevent
other uses that could revitalize the community or provide benefits to the
neighborhood. Abutters worry about the fiscal impacts a facility would have
on the town--whether their property taxes will rise because the town has to
improve its fire and police services to accommodate the sludge treatment
facility; or whether the town will lose tax revenues if the sludge facility,
which as a state facility is exempt from local taxes, takes the place of
development which could bring substantial tax revenues to the community.
Finally, abutters are interested in equity--that a community that already
"hosts" a regional facility, such as a prison, airport, or other type of waste
plant, should not have to bear additional burdens. Abutters believe that
regional responsibilities should be distributed among the towns and cities in
the region.
Local officials, while interested in physical impacts on their
constituents, are primarily concerned with the fiscal impacts and
socioeconomic impacts of the facility. In addition, they also believe that
regional responsibility should be distributed equitably. State and federal
environmental regulators are required by the statutes they enforce to ensure
that a sludge facility has minimal impacts on ecology and wetland, water
resources, air quality, and archaeological and historic resources. They are
- 99 -
also interested in ensuring that access routes used by the sludge transfer
trucks and barges are as reliable and as safe as possible. Finally, the
regulators desire that the sludge facility construction, as a component of the
harbor cleanup, be implemented as quickly as possible.
Smith summarizes the varying objectives of the stakeholder groups
in a table (see Table 4-1). She next turns her attention to combining these
objectives into a joint objectives hierarchy for all seven groups. Since she
believes that the MWRA's and regulators' concern with transportation
reliability is related to safety, she combines the reliability aspect with
safety to create one objective--"maximize transportation safety". Smith has
noticed that the harbor and local environmental groups have different
concerns relating to ecology and wetlands--the group interested in the
harbor is most concerned with harbor ecology and salt marshes, while the
local environmentalists are interested in local ecology and inland wetlands.
She therefore splits the ecology and wetlands concern into two
objectives--"minimize impacts on harbor ecology and wetlands", and "minimize
impacts on inland ecology and wetlands. "
The stakeholder groups' concern with water resources divides into
several objectives. The groups are concerned both with surface water and
with ground water that is used as a drinking water supply. Harbor
environmental groups worry about impacts on marine surface water bodies
(e.g., Boston Harbor), while local environmental groups are concerned with a
facility's impact on inland lakes, rivers, streams and ponds. Smith breaks
the water resources objectives into three new objectives--"minimize impacts
on harbor surface water", "minimize impacts on inland surface water", and
"minimize impacts on drinking water."
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TABLE 4-1
OBJECTIVES FOR INDIVIDUAL STAKEHOLDER GROUPS
MWRA
Transportation Reliability
Transportation Safety
Timely Implementation
Construction Costs
Operating Costs
Ratepayers
Operating Costs
Construction Costs
Harbor Environmental Groups
Timely Implementation
Harbor Ecology and Wetlands
Harbor Surface Water
Local Environmental Groups
Inland Ecology and Wetlands
Inland Surface Water
Drinking Water
Air Quality
Cultural Resources
Abutters
Transportation Safety
Equitable Distribution of Regional Responsibility
Water Resources
Air Quality
Noise
Socioeconomic Impacts
Fiscal Impacts
Visual Impacts
Local Officials
Fiscal Impacts
Socioeconomic Impact
Equitable Distribution of Regional Responsibility
Regulators
Transportation Reliability
Transportation Safety
Timely Implementation
Ecology and Wetlands
Water Resources
Air Quality
Cultural Resources
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Smith also adds the other concerns of the stakeholder groups--air
quality, noise, visual impacts, damage to archaeological and historical
resources, socioeconomic impacts, fiscal impacts, equity, and timely
implementation--to the joint objectives hierarchy. Finally, she includes
"1minimizing construction costs", but eliminates operating costs because as she
concluded in designing the technical model, these costs are not site-specific.
The final objectives hierarchy is shown in Figure 4-2.
Defining Attributes and Performance Measures
Next, Smith uses the information gained from her discussions with
the stakeholder groups to design constructed scales and performance measures
for each attribute. (Her final list of objectives and performance measures is
displayed in Table 4-2.) The abutter groups had outlined four major
conditions they felt entered into a site's transportation safety score: the
accident rate of the transportation mode (e.g., barge, truck); the general
accident rate along the access route; the type of land use around the access
route (e.g., commercial, residential, industrial); and whether any physical or
road geometry problems exist that would contribute to unsafe conditions.
Smith has no information about accident rates along the routes, so she
decides to incorporate only the other three considerations into a constructed
scale for transportation safety. The scale is shown in Table 4-3.
Smith uses the constructed scales from the technical model to
measure each site's performance on the next two attributes, harbor ecology
and wetlands and inland ecology and wetlands. These scales consider a
facility's impacts on wetlands, species of special concern, and threatened or
endangered species; habitat loss for all on-site species; and impacts on off-
site aquatic ecology due to runoff or airborne contaminants. Smith believes
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FIGURE 4-2
JOINT OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY FOR SEVEN STAKEHOLDER GROUPS
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ecology and wetlands
Minimize impacts on harbor
surface water
Minimize impacts on inland
surface water
Minimize impacts on drinking
water
Minimize adverse impacts on
air quality
Minimize noise impacts
Minimize adverse visual impacts
Minimize impacts on
archaeological and historic
resources
sMinimize socioeconomic impacts
-Minimize adverse fiscal impacts
JMaximize equitable distribution
of regional responsibility
'Maximize timely implementation
'Minimize construction costs
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TABLE 4-2
ATTRIBUTES AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE SITING DECISION
Obiective Performance Measure
1. Maximize transportation safety
2. Minimize adverse impacts on harbor
ecological systems
3. Minimize adverse impacts on inland
ecological systems
4. Minimize adverse impacts on harbor
surface water bodies
5. Minimize adverse impacts on inland
surface water bodies
6. Minimize adverse impacts on drinking
water supplies
7. Minimize adverse air quality impacts
8. Minimize noise impacts
9. Minimize visual impacts
10. Minimize adverse archaeological,
historic or cultural impacts
11. Minimize socioeconomic impacts
12. Minimize fiscal impacts
13. Maximize equitable distribution of
regional responsibility
14. Maximize timely implementation
15. Minimize construction costs
Xi: Constructed scale
X2: Constructed scale
X3: Constructed scale
X4: Constructed scale
X5: Constructed scale
X: Constructed scale
X7: Presence of
interaction
sources
(incineration)
Will odors reach
sensitive
receptors
(composting)
Xe: Distance to sensitive
receptors (in
feet)
Xe: Constructed scale
Xio: Constructed scale
Xii: Number of indicators
Xi: Constructed scale
X13: Number of "burdens"
already hosted
X14: Number of delay
indicators
Xi5: Number of special
conditions
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TABLE 4-3
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR ATTRIBUTE Xi: TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
Impact Level Accident Potential
0 Little or no accident potential
1 Moderate accident potential
2 High accident potential
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these scales encompass the concerns of environmental groups. The scales are
located in Tables 4-4 and 4-5.
Smith also decides to use the constructed scales from the technical
model to measure harbor and inland surface water impacts. These scales rate
a facility's potential for contaminating surface water bodies as low, moderate
or high on a particular site. Since the impacts for composting and
incineration are different (a compost facility can contaminate water bodies by
runoff, an incinerator by deposition of airborne contaminants), there are
separate scales for each technology. (Tables 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9). Smith
also uses the technical model's constructed scales for drinking water impacts.
These scales rate a facility's potential for contaminating ground water
drinking water supplies as non-existent, low, moderate, or high. Once again,
impacts differ by technology, so separate scales exist for composting and
incineration. (Tables 4-10, 4-11).
The technical model's measurements of air quality and noise will
also be used in this model. Air quality for a composting facility is measured
by determining whether odors reach sensitive receptors. For incineration, air
quality impacts are measured by deciding if there are other facilities nearby
whose emissions could interact with the sludge treatment facility's emissions
and degrade air quality. Noise impacts are measured by the distance from
the facility to the nearest sensitive noise receptor.
Smith must design a new scale to measure visual impacts. The
abutter groups have told her that they are concerned that a facility not be
an eyesore--that it blend into the neighborhood, or be buffered well so that
residents do not notice it. She designs a first cut at a scale that is based
on whether the facility will be located near residential neighborhoods, how
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TABLE 4-4
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X2: HARBOR ECOLOGY AND
WETLANDS
Impact Level Impacts in the Affected Area
0 No or minor alteration of wetlands;
no damage to species of plants or
wildlife that are of special concern',
threatened 2 or endangered 2; no loss
of habitat to any on-site species, or
habitat loss that is easily replaceable
off-site3 ; no damage to off-site aquatic
ecology due to runoff or airborne
contaminants
1 Moderate alteration of wetlands;
damage to species of plants or wildlife
that are of special concern; habitat loss
that is moderately replaceable off-site;
impacts on off-site aquatic ecology of
local importance due to runoff or
airborne contaminants
2 Heavy alteration of wetlands;
damage to species of plants or wildlife
that are threatened or endangered;
habitat loss that has limited
replaceability off-site; impacts on
off-site aquatic ecology of regional
importance due to runoff or airborne
contaminants
1 As listed by the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife
2 As listed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
3 This criterion does not mean that the agency should rebuild habitats
off-site; rather, it refers to the ease with which migrating species
can find replacement habitats off-site
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TABLE 4-5
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE Xa: INLAND ECOLOGY AND
WETLANDS
Impact Level Impacts in the Affected Area
0 No or minor alteration of wetlands;
no damage to species of plants or
wildlife that are of special concern',
threatened2 or endangered2 ; no loss
of habitat to any on-site species, or
habitat loss that is easily replaceable
off-site3 ; no damage to off-site aquatic
ecology due to runoff or airborne
contaminants
1 Moderate alteration of wetlands;
damage to species of plants or wildlife
that are of special concern; habitat loss
that is moderately replaceable off-site;
impacts on off-site aquatic ecology of
local importance due to runoff or
airborne contaminants
2 Heavy alteration of wetlands;
damage to species of plants or wildlife
that are threatened or endangered;
habitat loss that has limited
replaceability off-site; impacts on
off-site aquatic ecology of regional
importance due to runoff or airborne
contaminants
' As listed by the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife
2 As listed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
3 This criterion does not mean that the agency should rebuild habitats
off-site; rather, it refers to the ease with which migrating species
can find replacement habitats off-site
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TABLE 4-6
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X4: COMPOSTING FACILITY
IMPACTS ON HARBOR SURFACE WATER
ImDact Level Impacts in the Affected Area
No or low potential for harbor water
contamination due to stormwater runoff
Moderate potential for harbor water
contamination due to stormwater runoff
High potential for harbor water
contamination due to stormwater runoff
TABLE 4-7
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X4: INCINERATION
FACILITY IMPACTS ON HARBOR SURFACE WATER
ImDact Level ImDacts in the Affected Area
No or low potential for harbor water
contamination due to deposition of
airborne contaminants
Moderate potential for harbor water
contamination due to deposition of
airborne contaminants
High potential for harbor water
contamination due to deposition of
airborne contaminants
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0
1
2
0
1
2
TABLE 4-8
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X5: COMPOSTING FACILITY
IMPACTS ON INLAND SURFACE WATER
Impact Level Impacts in the Affected Area
0 No or low potential for surface water
contamination due to stormwater runoff
1 Moderate potential for surface water
contamination due to stormwater runoff
2 High potential for surface water
contamination due to stormwater runoff
TABLE 4-9
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE Xs: INCINERATION
FACILITY IMPACTS ON INLAND SURFACE WATER
Impact Level Impacts in the Affected Area
0 No or low potential for surface water
contamination due to deposition of
airborne contaminants
1 Moderate potential for surface water
contamination due to deposition of
airborne contaminants
2 High potential for surface water
contamination due to deposition of
airborne contaminants
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TABLE 4-10
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X6: COMPOSTING FACILITY
IMPACTS ON DRINKING WATER SUPPLY
Im t~o~ Level Impacts in Affected Area
0 No potential for water supply
contamination due to facility runoff
1 Low potential for water supply
contamination due to facility runoff
2 Moderate potential for water supply
contamination due to facility runoff
3 High potential for water supply
contamination due to facility runoff
TABLE 4-11
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE X6: INCINERATOR FACILITY
IMPACTS ON DRINKING WATER SUPPLY
Impacts in Affected Area
No potential for deposition of airborne
contaminants on aquifer recharge areas
Low potential for deposition of airborne
contaminants on aquifer recharge areas
Moderate potential for deposition of
airborne contaminants on aquifer recharge
areas
High potential for deposition of airborne
contaminants on aquifer recharge areas
0
1
2
3
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far from the facility the nearest residences are located, and whether
buffering is possible. She then examines this scale to see if it would satisfy
the interests of the other stakeholder groups. She believes that the harbor
environmental groups will not accept the scale because of its emphasis on
residential impacts. Members of these groups are concerned that a sludge
treatment facility might ruin harbor views. Smith therefore redesigns her
scale to rank visual impacts as minor, moderate, or major. (Table 4-12).
This scale is much more general than her first cut scale, and rankings will
be dependent on a group's highly subjective view of what minor, moderate or
major visual impacts are. She decides that if the results show that visual
impacts are very important to the stakeholder groups, she will try to
negotiate a more detailed scale to measure these impacts before deciding on
a site for the facility.
In her constructed scale for archaeological and historic impacts in
the technical model, Smith proposed to measure only those archaeological and
historic resources located on each site. Local environmental groups have
expressed a concern that a facility could impact historic resources near the
site, as well as those on the site. Smith decides to use the same scale, but
to include nearby historic resources in the impact assessments for each site.
The scale measures a site's archaeological and historic sensitivity as low,
moderate or high. The scale is found in Table 4-13.
The abutter groups had very strong opinions about how
socioeconomic impacts should be measured. First, they believed that any
constructed scale of socioeconomic impacts should include the possible decline
of property values near the facility and along transportation routes. Second,
the scale should measure whether the MWRA's use of the site will preclude
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TABLE 4-12
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR ATTRIBUTE Xs: VISUAL IMPACTS
Impact Level Impacts in Affected Area
0 No or minor visual impacts
1 Moderate visual impacts
2 Major visual impacts
TABLE 4-13
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR ATTRIBUTE Xio: ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORIC
IMPACTS
Impact Level
0
1
Sensitivity at Site
Low archaeological and historic sensitivity
Moderate archaeological and historic
sensitivity
High archaeological and historic
sensitivity
2
TABLE 4-14
CONSTRUCTED SCALE FOR ATTRIBUTE X12: FISCAL IMPACTS
Impact Level Impacts Predicted
0 No negative fiscal impacts
1 Low fiscal impacts
2 Moderate fiscal impacts
3 Heavy fiscal impacts
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other projects that could revitalize a community or provide benefits to a
neighborhood. Third, the scale should measure whether a sludge facility is
consistent with neighborhood character. Fourth, the facility's impact on a
community's open space and recreational areas should be included. Will the
MWRA be building the facility on land that was once a park, or used by
neighborhood children as playing fields? Fifth, the scale should measure the
impacts that could occur if construction and permanent workers at the
facility migrate into the community. Will the community have to build more
schools, and increase the level of other services such as police and fire
protection? Finally, the abutters want any socioeconomic scale to measure
the "stigma" that could be attached to a community if a sludge facility is
located there--a reputation as the region's "sludge dump", etc.
Smith assumes that any construction and permanent workers
migrating from outside the greater Boston area will not congregate in the
facility's host community, but will settle in many towns in the area. She
therefore eliminate inmigrant impacts from the scale. She decides to include
the other five criteria in the scale. She will measure a site's performance
on the socioeconomic objective by counting how many socioeconomic conditions
could result from a sludge facility being located in the town. The five
conditions are:
Property values in the vicinity of the site will drop.
The MWRA's use of the site will affect future revitalization efforts.
The MWRA's plans are inconsistent with neighborhood character.
Locating the facility on this site will cause the community to lose
open space.
Locating the facility on this site will cause the community to be
viewed by others as a "dump site".
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Smith decides to measure the next attribute, fiscal impacts, by
calculating the revenues localities will lose in taxes if the site is used by
the MWRA. The MWRA, a state agency, is exempt from local property taxes.
Although the agency will probably pay the host community payments in lieu
of taxes, Smith decides to ignore that possibility in this model, so that she
can determine which communities would suffer the greatest amount of lost
revenues. The revenues can be lost because a state agency takes over a
site where property taxes are currently being paid, or because the state
takes over a site for which revenue-generating projects, such as condominium
of industrial parks, have been proposed. Because Smith has no information
about local tax rates and revenues, she decides to construct a scale that
ranks negative fiscal impacts of the facility as non-existent, low, moderate,
or heavy. The scale is found In Table 4-14.
Measuring the next attribute, equitable distribution of regional
responsibility, requires some negotiation between abutters, local officials and
the MWRA. In public meetings held before Smith assumed her position at the
agency, the MWRA asked communities to list the regional facilities they
hosted that people considered "burdens". The resulting list contained waste
disposal facilities, prisons, airports, power stations, and public transportation
stations. Smith does not consider public transportation stations, which
benefit people living nearby, to be regional "burdens". She therefore
eliminates these from her list of facilities already hosted by each community.
A site's performance on the equity attribute will be measured by the number
of burdens a town or city already hosts.
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Environmental groups and regulators have identified four possible
causes of delay in timely implementation of the project. These are:
Delay caused by the need to clean up hazardous waste on a site
before permits can be issued.
Delay caused by political opposition to the site from state legislators
and other politicians.
Delay caused by the necessity to negotiate or coordinate with other
agencies proposing to use a site.
Delay caused by public protest, in the form of litigation or civil
disobedience.
A site's performance on this attribute will be measured by the number of
possible causes of delay at each site.
In her discussions with abutters, Smith has discovered that they are
not concerned with timely implementation at all. In fact, Smith believes that
abutters value sites where delay will occur more highly than other sites.
Since most abutters do not want a facility in their "backyard", they value
anything that could delay or prevent implementation of a siting decision.
Because abutters' interests on the timely implementation attribute are in
opposition to those of other groups, Smith decides to eliminate the attribute
from her model for abutters.
The final attribute, minimizing construction costs, is measured with
the same scale as in the technical model. The scale measures the number of
special circumstances at each site that could cause additional costs. (See
Table 2-9 in Chapter II).
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Assessing Impacts and Probabilities
Next, Smith makes educated guesses based on her discussions with
members of the stakeholder groups to assess each site's performance on each
attribute.6  All seven groups judge the transportation safety impacts of a
sludge facility on Deer Island to be minimal. Sludge will be transported to
and from Deer Island by barge, and on routes that will not interfere with
recreational boating. Sludge could be brought to the Lynn site either by
barge or by truck. The MWRA, ratepayers, both environmental groups, and
regulators believe that the sludge will be transported by truck, and that
transportation safety impacts will be moderate. The access road to the Lynn
site is a commercial/industrial strip with some awkward turns, a few
pedestrian crossings, and signalized intersections. Local officials and
abutters believe there is an even chance that sludge will be transported by
barge. If this situation occurs, these groups predict a high accident
potential at the Lynn site, since the barges will have to go through Lynn
Harbor, an area congested with recreational boats in the summer.
At the Quincy site, sludge will arrive by barge and leave by truck,
rail or barge. The MWRA, ratepayers, environmental groups, and regulators
judge that transportation safety impacts at this site will be minor. Local
officials and abutters believe there is some possibility that impacts will be
moderate, because there is a lot of boat traffic in the Fore River and
because nearby streets are congested. All groups judge impacts at Spectacle
Island to be minimal, since sludge will arrive at and leave the island by
6. The text discusses general differences and similarities among the impact
assessments and probability judgments of the various groups; the detailed
assessments and probabilities are found in the accompanying tables.
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barge on routes that will not interfere with recreational boating and other
harbor traffic. The MWRA, ratepayers, environmental groups and regulators
believe that impacts at the Stoughton site will likely be minimal, because the
access route is a commercial road with no physical or geometry problems.
Local officials and abutters, however, believe there is a 50 percent chance
that impacts will be moderate, because sensitive land uses around the
route--a small park, school bus routes--would increase the probability of
accidents.
The MWRA, ratepayers, environmental groups,and regulators judge
that there is a 60 percent probability that there will be a high potential for
accidents at the Walpole site. The site is located in the midst of residential
areas, and the access roads were not designed for truck use. There are also
a lot of sensitive uses along the access route--several schools, a library,
and recreational areas. Local officials and abutters agree that impacts will
be severe, but they do not see any uncertainties around the assessment--
they believe that the probability of high accident potential is 100 percent.
Two options exists for access to the Wilmington site. The MWRA prefers to
use Ballardvale Road, a commercial/industrial strip. However, if the town of
Wilmington decides to renovate Ballardvale Road, the sludge trucks will have
to detour through a residential area during construction. The MWRA,
ratepayers, environmental groups and regulators believe there is 40 percent
chance that impacts will be moderate (if the residential road must be used),
and a 60 percent chance that impacts will be minimal (the agency can use
Ballardvale Road without interruption). All of the groups' impact and
probability assessments for the transportation safety attribute are detailed in
Table 4-15.
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Next, Smith measures performance on the second attribute, harbor
ecology and wetlands. All of the stakeholder groups believe that there is a
greater chance that impacts on harbor ecology and wetlands from a sludge
facility on Deer Island will be severe than moderate. The reason for this is
that there is limited replaceability for the habitats that will be destroyed by
construction of the facility. Both environmental groups and regulators judge
the probability that impacts will be severe to be slightly more than that
judged by the MWRA, ratepayers, local officials, and abutters. At the Lynn
site, construction of a facility could alter 10 acres of wetlands. The MWRA,
ratepayers, local officials and abutters judge that there is a 50 percent
chance that impacts on harbor ecology will be moderate, rather than minimal,
at this site. Environmental groups and regulators believe the probability
that impacts will be moderate, not minimal, is 70 percent.
At the Quincy site, the MWRA, ratepayers , local officials and
abutters believe that impacts will probably be minimal, with a 10 percent
chance that they could be severe. Environmental groups and regulators
believe there is a 30 percent chance that impacts could be severe. On
Spectacle Island, the limited replaceability of habitats and the possible
contamination of lobster trapping grounds leads the MWRA, ratepayers, local
officials and abutters to judge that there is an 80 percent chance that
impacts will be severe. Environmental groups and regulators assess that
probability at 90 percent. No impacts to harbor ecology and wetlands are
expected at the Stoughton, Walpole and Wilmington sites, because these sites
are not located on the coast. The impact and probability assessments of all
seven groups are located in Table 4-16.
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No impacts are expected at the Deer Island, Lynn, Quincy, and
Spectacle Island sites for the third attribute, inland ecology and wetlands.
At the Stoughton site, the MWRA, ratepayers, local officials, abutters, and
harbor environmental groups judge that the probability that impacts could be
severe due to the possible alteration of more than 20 acres of wetlands is 50
percent. Local environmental groups and regulators believe this probability
to be 70 percent. The MWRA, ratepayers, abutters, local officials and harbor
environmental groups assess a 10 percent chance that impacts will be severe
at the Walpole site, due to contamination of the Neponset River. Local
environmental groups and regulators believe that a probability of 40 percent
is more accurate. In Wilmington, local environmental groups and regulators
believe that limited replaceability of habitats justifies a 90 percent
probability that impacts will be severe, while the other stakeholder groups
believe the probability is 70 percent. Detailed impact and probability
assessments for this attribute are found in Table 4-17.
All seven stakeholder groups agree that there is a high potential
for stormwater runoff from a composting pile or airborne contaminants from
an incinerator on Deer Island or Spectacle Island to contaminate harbor
surface water. The groups also agree that there is a 50 percent probability
of moderate contamination of harbor surface water at the Lynn and Quincy
sites. Because the Stoughton, Walpole and Wilmington sites are located
inland, there will be no impact on harbor surface water from a facility at
these sites. The impact and probability assessments are in Tables 4-18 and
4-19.
No impacts on inland surface water are expected from facilities
located at the Deer Island, Lynn, Quincy and Spectacle Island sites. The
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stakeholder groups agree that the probability that impacts would be severe
at the Stoughton site is 50 percent, and that they would be moderate at the
Walpole site, 50 percent. Moderate impacts are also predicted for the
Wilmington site. The impact and probability assessments are located in
Tables 4-20 and 4-21.
The groups disagree about the potential for drinking water supply
contamination due to runoff from a composting pile at several sites. They
agree that there is a 90 percent chance that there will be no water supply
contamination from a composting facility at Deer Island, Quincy or Spectacle
Island. The MWRA, ratepayers, and harbor environmental groups assess the
probability that a moderate potential for contamination exists at the Lynn
site at 10 percent, while abutters, local environmental groups, regulators and
local officials believe this probability to be 30 percent. At the Stoughton
site, the MWRA, ratepayers and harbor environmental groups assess a 50
percent probability that impacts will be high; while abutters, local
environmental groups, regulators and local officials assess this probability at
80 percent. At both the Walpole and Wilmington sites, the MWRA, ratepayers
and harbor environmental groups believe the probability of moderate impact
is 10 percent, while abutters, local environmental groups, regulators and
local officials judge it to be higher, at 30 percent. The impact and
probability assessments are detailed in Table 4-22.
Abutters, local environmental groups, regulators and local officials
judge the potential for deposition of airborne contaminants from a sludge
incinerator on aquifer recharge areas to be more probable than do the MWRA,
ratepayers and harbor environmental groups. The former groups believe
- 126 -
/unPAeT 4b 90646JLOYe ASESSwV)) ITh
7q~aLE q-ao
A16Tyu& Ak * C"nPO.3vU6. CI/n IMnPAC~T OPJ ,AA.)b BUIFACG
LqbsJ 001.0)
£IPECTAqCLS 06(i0)
ISL~cA~b
bilLAJIMA) (.1)
of(io)
o (I.e.)
l.s)
o(.s\
o i
0(0.0)
o06
o0Cio)
OC(.)
o0(.0)
00.s)
o ( c 0)
00(.0)
.CA
00i.0) 00i.o)
cCI) O(A
I (.%.)I($
' (.i)I (.d)
£sqTe
nMCr Am P4064Aewy 45SEWMWTI7
sin.
&5AA;b
ST&SA.f
OL/4LlbLj
o (I.S)
a (.s)
ICh~
06i.6)
I (A)
J) CS)
oC(.)
C (.r
1146L6 q-ai
AbL AMr~160TE ta 4 /AewsMG &~
o
I (' 4A
O(J
o A
PFACI..ry Itm4GCT'
O0)
d C. )
IC.)
00~ JOIJL4Ab SL)U)ICE 1CA769
Lo!oLi
0 (f. o0)
OCT
164.s
001.6)
Iim(.s)
qoC. 3)
I
06.')
11.Mei- ha~u 0404446WAts sessnle&rs FOR
IfA&E,
4mraur~4 CoVniOOS7?/A* FAQC~I( Inf tmg O&) 14AWLIAJ6& WAJTER?
Loia
7>669~
WAL POL6
IAV6PJ&0A
I (. 1)
o(-
/ (3 1)
a (.9)
CS
o(.0)
0 (.)
1 ('i1
o0(.9)
I(.A'
o (.#)
0)
o A
O ( .9)
5 (.1)
o(.i)
* (.(.)
~
o ( .q)
9 (.1)
o
1 (.1)
-AQAI
0(.9)
o (.9)
1 (.1)
(4~)
.3 aS,)
i C(.v)
0 C-1)
o C.,,)
a~ (.*A
o (.4
I (.~)
o Ca)
I (.'4
~
0 C.?)
I ()
a (0)
oC'
o00)
60)
O C. ~)
(s)
o c.i)
C.~)
~ (.1)
"(.9,)
I (a)
I (.~)
1 (.16
.: (,)
3 (P3)
a(c)
I., (*~)
* C.')
I (a.)
~1 (.~,)
0(a)
, (A.)
~ (#3)
airborne particulates can travel farther, thus impacting larger areas. The
impact and probability assessments are found in Table 4-23.
None of the groups disagree with the MWRA's judgments about how
far odors will travel from a composting facility and whether there are other
facilities whose emissions might interact with those from a sludge incinerator
and degrade air quality. The groups agree that odors will reach sensitive
receptors at the Lynn, Quincy, Stoughton, Walpole and Wilmington sites, and
that there is uncertainty around the estimates at the Lynn and Stoughton
sites. (The odor distance calculations are shown in Table 4-24). Interaction
sources are present at the Deer Island and Lynn sites, and might be present
at the Quincy site sometime in the future. The parties also agree with the
MWRA's noise impact. assessments (Table 4-25).
The stakeholder groups assess the visual impacts of the facility
separately for each technology. At the Deer Island site, the immediate
surrounding land use is the MWRA's sewage treatment plant. The MWRA,
ratepayers, regulators and local officials believe that a composting facility
will have no or minor visual impacts at Deer Island. These groups judge
that a medium to tall incinerator stack would have moderate visual impacts.
Environmental groups and abutters, on the other hand, believe that a
composting facility will have moderate impacts, and that an incinerator would
have a major visual impact.
The Lynn site is currently used for industrial purposes--the
neighborhood includes truck parking for a dairy plant, and the city of Lynn's
sewage treatment plant and sludge landfill. The MWRA, ratepayers,
regulators and local officials judge that a composting facility will have little
or no visual impacts at the Lynn site, and that an incinerator would have
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TABLE 4-24
CALCULATION OF ODOR IMPACTS
Site
Deer Island
Lynn
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Stoughton
Walpole
Wilmington
Distance
Odors Will
Travel
734--2217*
734--2217*
656--984
1640
656--984
734--2217*
2624
Distance to
Nearest Sensitive
Receptor
5280
2000
500
4000
800
500
1000
Odors
Will
Impact
Sensitive
Receptor
No
Yes*
Yes
No
Yes*
Yes
Yes
* Estimate based on mean distance at other sites plus or minus one standard
deviation
** Uncertain because of range
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TABLE 4-25
DISTANCE FROM SITE TO SENSITIVE NOISE RECEPTORS
Site Distance to Sensitive Receptors (in feet)
Deer Island 5280
Lynn 2000
Quincy 500
Spectacle Island 4000
Stoughton 800
Walpole 500
Wilmington 1000
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moderate impacts. The environmental groups and abutters believe that the
composting facility would have moderate impact, and that an incinerator
would have major visual impacts.
The Quincy site is a former shipyard that still contains numerous
dry docks and cranes. Proposals have been made to build a hazardous waste
incinerator to the south of the site, and to reopen an electrical power plant
directly across the river. The MWRA, ratepayers, regulators, and local
officials believe that both the composting facility and the incinerator would
have no visual impacts at the Quincy site. Environmental groups and
abutters believe that both facilities would have moderate visual impacts.
A 90-foot high draft chimney from an abandoned grease extraction
plant remains on Spectacle Island. The MWRA, ratepayers, regulators and
local officials believe that a composting facility would have no visual impact
on views of Boston Harbor, while an incinerator might have moderate impacts.
Environmental groups and abutters (people who live near the Harbor) believe
that a composting facility would have moderate impacts, and an incinerator
would have major visual impacts.
The Stoughton site is located near an industrial park and several
sand and gravel operations. No residences are directly next to the site, but
instead are located around the wider industrial area. The MWRA, ratepayers,
regulators, local officials and harbor environmental groups judge that a
composting facility at Stoughton would have no visual impacts, and that an
incinerator would have moderate impacts. Local environmental groups and
abutters, however, judge that the composting facility would have moderate
impacts, and that the incinerator would have major visual impacts.
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The Walpole site is located on the former Bird family estate. Tree
cover on the site would provide a partial visual buffer between the facility
and residences nearby. The MWRA, ratepayers, regulators, local officials and
harbor environmental groups believe that a composting facility would have
moderate visual impacts on the neighborhood, and that an incinerator would
have major impacts. Local environmental groups and abutters believe that
both the composting facility and incinerator would have major impacts on the
area.
The Wilmington site is surrounded by single family residences, an
office park, and light industrial and commercial businesses. The MWRA,
ratepayers, regulators, local officials and harbor environmental groups judge
that a composting facility would have moderate visual impacts, and that an
incinerator would have major impacts. Local environmental groups and
abutters believe that both facilities would have major visual impacts on the
neighborhood. The impact assessments for all of the groups are summarized
in Tables 4-26 and 4-27.
Next, Smith guesses at impact and probability assessments for
archaeological and historic resources. The MWRA, ratepayers, local officials,
regulators and abutters all believe that the Deer Island has a 50 percent
chance of having a moderate archaeological and historic sensitivity,and a 50
percent chance of having low archaeological and historic sensitivity. Both
environmental groups believe that the probability of moderate sensitivity is
60 percent, while the probability of low sensitivity at Deer Island is 40
percent. At the Lynn site, all stakeholder groups agree that archaeological
and historic sensitivity is low, because the site is on filled ground. The
MWRA, ratepayers, local officials, regulators and abutters believe that there
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is a 50 percent chance that the Quincy site will have moderate
archaeological and historic sensitivity. Environmental groups believe that
probability to be 60 percent. An archaeological site has already been
discovered on Spectacle Island. The MWRA, ratepayers, local officials,
regulators and abutters believe that there is a 50 percent probability that
the entire site has high archaeological and historic sensitivity.
Environmental groups believe that probability to be 70 percent. At the
Stoughton site, environmental groups believe there is a 50 percent chance
that the sludge facility will have high impacts on the Mary Baker Eddy
homestead located one-half mile from the site. The rest of the stakeholder
groups believe that probability to be 10 percent. The Walpole site is located
in an area of extremely high archaeological sensitivity and the site contains
a mansion eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. All of the
groups agree that the site has high archaeological and historic sensitivity.
The Wilmington site is surrounded by a core area of prehistoric activity.
Environmental groups believe that the probability that the site has high
archaeological and historic sensitivity is 90 percent, while the MWRA,
ratepayers, local officials, regulators and abutters believe the probability is
70 percent. The impact and probability assessments are contained in Table
4-28.
Socioeconomic impacts are measured by the number of indicators of
impact at each site. These indicators are: whether property values will
decline; whether the MWRA's use of the site precludes revitalization efforts;
whether the MWRA's use of the site is consistent with neighborhood
character; and whether the community will lose open space. Deer Island is
reserved for the MWRA's sewage treatment plant. Property values around the
site will not decline if a sludge treatment facility is built there--it is
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assumed that property values would have dropped a long time ago, when the
primary sewage treatment plant was built. The MWRA's plans for the site are
consistent with neighborhood character, and the community will not lose any
open space if a sludge facility is built on Deer Island. Since Deer Island is
already the site of the sewage treatment plant, no stigma should attach to
the community.
All of the stakeholder groups agree that none of the socioeconomic indicators
are present at Deer Island.
No residences border the Lynn site, so property values are not
expected to drop. The area in which the site is located is already used for
the city of Lynn's sewage treatment plant and sludge landfill, so the MWRA's
sludge facility would be consistent with neighborhood character. The
community would not lose open space if a sludge facility was built on the
site. The MWRA's use of the site would conflict with the city's plans to
revitalize the Lynn Harbor waterfront, however. Several developers have
proposed to build shopping, hotel and condominiums near the site, and to
develop a harborfront park area. The city's reputation could suffer if a
sludge treatment facility was built on the site. The seven stakeholder
groups all agree that two socioeconomic indicators are present at the Lynn
site.
No revitalization projects are planned by the city of Quincy for the
Fore River Shipyard. The shipyard is being used by the MWRA for interim
sludge treatment and as staging areas for the construction of the secondary
treatment plant on Deer Island, so a sludge facility would not be inconsistent
with neighborhood character. The city would not lose open space if a sludge
facility was built at the shipyard. The stakeholder groups are uncertain
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whether a sludge facility would result in declining property values near the
site. The MWRA, ratepayers, harbor environmentalists, local
environmentalists, and regulators argue that property values around the
shipyard declined years ago, and that no further decline would result from
the sludge facility. They judge that the probability that property values
would decline is about 50 percent. Abutters and local officials, however,
believe that the probability of declining property values is 70 percent. They
also believe that Quincy would suffer from a "stigma" is the sludge treatment
plant were sited there. The other groups, arguing that Quincy is already the
site of the MWRA's staging area and the interim sludge treatment plant,
believe that no stigma would attach to Quincy.
No residences are located around Spectacle Island, so there would be
no decline in property values if a sludge facility were built on the island.
The island has been used as a dump for years, so a sludge facility would be
consistent with "neighborhood character", and the City of Boston would not
lose open space if facility were built. There have been proposals to
revitalize Spectacle Island and make it into a harbor park. The MWRA's use
of the island for a sludge facility would block these efforts. All of the
groups believe there is a 70 percent probability that the MWRA's use of
Spectacle Island would preclude revitalization efforts. No stigma is expected
to attach to the City of Boston if a sludge facility were built on the island.
Some single family residences are located near the Stoughton site,
and it is expected that their owners could experience a decline in property
value. Much of the site is currently forested, so the town would lose open
space if the MWRA built a sludge facility there. The rest of the site is used
for gravel and asphalt plants, so a sludge facility would be consistent with
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the neighborhood character. No revitalization plans have been proposed for
the area. Stoughton could gain a reputation as the region's "sludge dump" if
the facility were located there. All of the stakeholder groups agree that
three socioeconomic indicators are present at the Stoughton site.
The Walpole site is located in a residential area, so the MWRA's use
of it for a sludge facility would be inconsistent with neighborhood character.
The community could suffer from stigma. Homeowners could expect a decline
in property values. Most of the site is currently open space, and part of
the site has been identified in the town's open space master plan as a
candidate for purchase as conservation land. A plan has been proposed to
change the zoning in the area so that cluster housing could be built on the
site. All of the groups agree that five socioeconomic indicators are present
at the Walpole site.
Some residences are located near the Wilmington site, and
homeowners could experience a decline in property values. A residential
subdivision is being developed at the eastern end of the site, so the MWRA's
use of the site for a sludge facility would be inconsistent with neighborhood
character. The town could suffer from the stigma of being the region's
"sludge dump". The site is currently forested, so the town would lose open
space if a sludge facility was built. No revitalization projects have been
proposed for the area. The stakeholder groups agree that four socioeconomic
indicators are present at the Wilmington site. The indicators at each site
and probability assessments for all of the groups are found in Table 4-29.
Next, Smith measures each site's performance on the fiscal impact
attribute. This attribute is measured by whether localities will lose no, low,
moderate or large amounts of revenues because a state agency would be
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TABLE 4-29
SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS AT EACH SITE
Deer Island 0
Lynn 2
Conflict with revitalization efforts
Stigma
Quincy Abutters and local officials: 1 (.3)* 2 (.7)
All other groups: 0 (.5) 1 (.5)
Property value decline"
Stigma***
Spectacle Island All groups: 0 (.3) 1 (.7)
Conflict with revitalization efforts"
Stoughton 3
Property value decline
Loss of open space
Stigma
Walpole 5
Property value decline
Conflict with revitalization efforts
Inconsistent with neighborhood character
Loss of open space
Stigma
Wilmington 4
Property value decline
Inconsistent with neighborhood character
Loss of open space
Stigma
*Probability
"Uncertainty
***Disagreement
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occupying the site. The Deer Island site is already owned by the MWRA. No
fiscal impacts are expected at this site by any of the seven stakeholder
groups. The Lynn site is privately owned, and three companies pay taxes on
it. Several uses have been proposed for the site, including marine-based
industrial projects, and some spillover effect from a large mixed use
residential and hotel project directly to the south of the site. The MWRA,
environmental groups, ratepayers, regulators and abutters all believe that the
probability that no development occurs on the site, and that the city of
Lynn loses only the current taxes paid, will be 60 percent. In that case,
the fiscal impacts of the sludge treatment facility would be low. Local
officials believe the probability of this scenario to be only 40 percent. They
judge the probability that mixed use development could spill over to the site,
resulting in large tax revenues to the city, to be 50 percent. If the MWRA
used the site for a sludge facility, the fiscal impacts would therefore be very
heavy. The other stakeholder groups judge the probability of this scenario
to be only 10 percent.
The Quincy site is owned by the MWRA, so all of the groups agree
that there will be no fiscal impacts on the city of Quincy if a sludge facility
is sited there. Spectacle Island is owned by the city of Boston and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. No taxes are paid on it now, and none
would be paid if the island became a public park. The Stoughton site is
privately owned, and several gravel and asphalt companies are paying taxes
on the land. Proposed uses for the site include a small commercial project
and scattered industrial development. These projects would bring medium-
sized revenues to the town. The MWRA, environmental groups, regulators,
ratepayers and abutters believe the probability that this development would
occur is 20 percent. If the MWRA used the site for a sludge facility,
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precluding commercial or industrial development, the town would suffer
moderate fiscal impacts. Local officials judge the probability of this scenario
occurring to be 50 percent.
The Walpole site is also privately owned. The site is industrially
zoned, but there are proposals to change the zoning to allow clustered
residential development. Local officials believe the probability that the
zoning will be changed and the cluster housing developed to be 50 percent.
If the MWRA's siting precluded this development, the town would suffer heavy
fiscal impacts. The local officials judge that there is a 30 percent
probability that the site will be developed as currently zoned. The other
stakeholder groups assign a 20 percent probability to the cluster development
scenario, and judge that there is a 20 percent probability that industrial
development would take place on the site. They believe that the probability
that no development would occur on the site is 60 percent.
The Wilmington site is privately owned. No developments have been
proposed for the site. However, a residential subdivision has been created
at the eastern end of the site. Local officials judge the probability that
more subdivisions would be created on the site to be 50 percent. The other
stakeholder groups believe this probability to be 20 percent. If residential
development was precluded by a sludge facility, the town would suffer
moderate fiscal impacts. The impact and probability assessments for each
group are summarized in Table 4-30.
The equitable distribution of regional responsibility attribute is
measured by the number of regional "burdens" a community already hosts.
Deer Island already contains the MWRA's wastewater treatment plant, and a
correctional facility. The people of the nearby town of Winthrop also bear
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the noise impacts from nearby Logan International Airport. As part of a
negotiated agreement with the town of Winthrop over the secondary treatment
plant siting, the city of Boston agreed to move the correctional facility
before 1991. The MWRA, environmental groups, ratepayers and regulators
therefore do not include the correctional facility as a regional burden hosted
by Winthrop. Local officials and abutters, however, believe that Winthrop
should be credited for having hosted the facility, whether it will be moved
or not. They believe that the Deer Island site hosts three regional burdens,
while the other groups believes it hosts only two.
Local officials and abutters argue that the city of Lynn hosts a
regional burden because it has a sewage treatment plant that is used by the
city, and the nearby towns of Saugus and Nahant. The other stakeholder
groups believe that this facility is not really "regional", since it benefits the
city of Lynn directly, and serves only two other towns. They judge that
Lynn does not host any regional burdens.
The city of Quincy is already host to the MWRA's staging areas and
interim sludge treatment facility at the Fore River Shipyard. In addition, a
hazardous waste incinerator will be built near the border of the city. Other
proposals for the areas include the restarting of a large, regional electrical
plant across the river from the shipyard, and the construction of a solid
waste incinerator in nearby Weymouth. The MWRA, environmental groups,
ratepayers and regulators believe there is only a 10 percent chance that
these last two facilities will be built, thereby giving Quincy five regional
burdens. Local officials and abutters believe that there is a 30 percent
probability that these projects will be constructed.
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Spectacle Island, Stoughton and Wilmington do not host any regional
burdens. The town of Walpole, however, is the site of a state prison. All of
the stakeholder groups agree that Walpole hosts one regional burden. A list
of burdens hosted by each site and each stakeholder group's probability
assessments is found in Table 4-31.
Four considerations make up the measure of a site's performance on
the next attribute, timely implementation. They are: delay caused by
permitting problems; delay caused by political problems; delay caused by
competing public uses; and delay caused by local protest. The six
stakeholder groups (not including abutters) judge that only one of these
indicators will be present at the Deer Island site. The people of Winthrop
feel that they have hosted enough regional facilities, and they are certain
to protest a sludge facility. The Lynn site is contaminated with hazardous
waste, and will involve permitting delays. In addition, political delays may
occur because the site is privately owned, and the MWRA must get legislative
approval to take the land by eminent domain. There are thus two delay
indicators present at the site. In addition, the stakeholder groups believe
that there is a 50 percent chance that local protest could delay construction
of the facility.
The Quincy site is contaminated with hazardous waste, and may
involve permitting delays. In addition, the people of Quincy are expected to
protest the siting decision, because they already host the MWRA's staging
facility, its interim sludge treatment plant, and several other regional
facilities. At Spectacle Island, permitting delays are expected because of the
amount of trash and waste on the site. In addition, political delays might
occur because a powerful politician has proposed developing the island into a
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TABLE 4-31
NUMBER OF REGIONAL BURDENS HOSTED BY EACH COMMUNITY
Deer Island Abutters and local officials: 3
All other groups:
Sewage treatment plant
Logan Airport
(City of Boston correctional facility)
Lynn
Quincy
Abutters and local officials: 1
All other groups:
(Lynn sewage treatment plant)
2
0
Abutters and local officials: 3 (.4)* 4 (.3) 5 (.3)
All other groups: 3 (.7) 4 (.2) 5 (.1)
MWRA staging area
Interim sludge facility
Clean Harbors hazardous waste facility
Edgar Power Station*
Weymouth solid waste incinerator"
Spectacle Island
Stoughton
Walpole
0
0
1
Cedar Junction MCI--state prison
Wilmington 0
*Probability
"Uncertainty
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harbor park. There might also be a competing use for the island--the state
Secretary of Transportation has proposed using Spectacle Island as the dump
for fill from a large road construction project in the Boston area. In
addition, people who live around the harbor might protest the use of the
island for a sludge facility. The stakeholder groups believe the probability
that all four delay indicators will be present at the Spectacle Island site to
be 10 percent. They judge that there is a 60 percent chance that three
indicators will be present at the site.
Political delay could result from the choice of Stoughton as the site
of the sludge facility, because the land is privately owned, and legislative
approval is required for its acquisition. In addition, the stakeholder groups
believe that there is a 50 percent chance that local protest could delay
timely implementation of the sludge project. Legislative approval is also
required for acquisition of the Walpole site, and people in Walpole are
expected to protest the siting decision since they already host a state
prison. At the Wilmington site, the need for legislative approval could delay
construction of the facility. The stakeholder groups also judge that there is
a 50 percent chance that local protest could delay implementation of the
project. The delay indicators and probability assessments for all sites are
listed in Table 4-32.
Measurement of the final attribute, construction cost, is performed
the same as in the technical model. All of the stakeholder groups agree
with the MWRA's assessment on this attribute. The cost indicators for each
site and the groups' probability assessments are summarized in Table 4-33.
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TABLE 4-32
CONDITIONS THREATENING TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION--BY SITE
Deer Island
Lo
Lynn
Pe
Pol
Lo
Quincy
Pe
Lo
cal protest
2 (.5)*
rmitting delay
itical delay
cal protest"
2
rmitting delay
cal protest
Spectacle Island
Permitting delay
Political delay
Competing use**
Local protest
2 (.3) 3 (.6) 4 (.1)
Stoughton
Walpole
Political delay
Local protest**
2
Political delay
Local protest
1 (.5) 2 (.5)
Wilmington 1 (.5) 2 (.5)
Political delay
Local protest"
*Probability
"Uncertainty
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1
3 (.5)
TABLE 4-33
SPECIAL CONDITIONS THAT COULD RAISE CONSTRUCTION COSTS--BY SITE
Deer Island 5
Blasting
Moderate soil cleanup
Moderate water cleanup
Dewatering
Unique or scarce resources
Lynn 6 (.6)' 7 (.3) 8 (.1) * Probability
Blasting * Uncertainty
Moderate soil cleanup
Extensive soil cleanup**
Moderate water cleanup
Dewatering
Transportation improvements
Unique or scarce resources
Site utilities"
Quincy 5
Moderate soil cleanup
Extensive soil cleanup
Moderate water cleanup
Dewatering
Unique or scarce resources
Spectacle Island 6
Moderate soil cleanup
Moderate water cleanup
Dewatering
Transportation improvements
Unique or scarce resources
Site utilities
Stoughton 3 (.5) 4 (.2) 5 (.2) 6 (.1)
Blasting
Moderate soil cleanup**
Moderate water cleanup**
Dewatering
Transportation improvements
Site utilities"
Walpole 1 (.7) 2 (.3)
Transportation improvements
Site utilities"
Wilmington 3 (.7) 4 (.3)
Blasting
Dewatering
Transportation improvements
Site utilities"
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Assessing Preferences
Smith now turns her attention to assessing preferences for the
impact levels of each attribute. She decides to put herself in the position of
the representatives of each stakeholder group, and to make guesses about
each group's preferences. She uses the five-point assessment method
discusses in the technical model chapter. Her "utility guesses" for the
attributes are displayed in Figures 4-3 through 4-16. As in the technical
model, the utility for a "yes" answer on the air quality attribute is 0, and
for a "no" answer, 1.
The utility graphs show the different risk attitudes stakeholder
groups have about different attributes. For example, all of the groups are
risk-averse on the first attribute, transportation safety (Figure 4-3).
However, local officials and abutters are more risk-averse than are the
MWRA, ratepayers, both environmental groups and regulators. The MWRA and
ratepayers are risk-neutral on the noise attribute (Figure 4-9). Abutters,
on the other hand, are very risk-averse. On the equity attribute (Figure
4-14), the MWRA, ratepayers, both environmental groups and regulators are
"risk-prone"--they prefer a lottery with equal chances of a best and a worst
outcome to a certainty. Abutters and local officials are very risk-averse on
this attribute. Environmental groups, abutters and regulators are risk-
neutral on the construction cost attribute (Figure 4-16). The MWRA,
ratepayers and local officials are all risk-averse on this attribute. 7
7. Local officials are judged to be risk-averse on construction costs because
they must decide how to assess their constituent ratepayers for MWRA rate
increases. The MWRA is a wholesale provider of sewer and water services
to cities and towns; the local governments are responsible for distributing
the wholesale cost among individual homeowners and businesses.
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Making Tradeoffs among Objectives
Next, Smith uses the information from her discussions with
representatives of stakeholder groups to try to guess how each group would
make tradeoffs among objectives and weight each attribute. She uses the
method described in Chapter II, asking herself, "If I were a representative of
that group, and all attributes were at their worst level, which would I want
to bring to its best level?" It is easy for Smith to assess the MWRA's
ranking of the attributes--she is the agency's representative in her
hypothetical negotiation structure. Smith ranks the attributes as follows:
Timely Implementation
Construction Costs
Transportation Safety
Drinking Water Impacts
Fiscal Impacts
Harbor Surface Water
Socioeconomic Impacts
Air Quality
Noise
Harbor Ecology
Inland Surface Water
Inland Ecology
Equitable Distribution of Regional
' Responsibility
Visual Impacts
Cultural Resources
It is interesting to note that the MWRA ranks fiscal impacts above impacts
on harbor surface water, and ranks socioeconomic impact and noise above
harbor ecology. Although the agency has an environmental mission, it is more
concerned with the impacts its projects will have on people nearby. The
agency ranks equity, visual impacts, and cultural impacts very low, however.
As expected, the MWRA ranks timely implementation and construction costs
most heavily. The tradeoffs Smith makes using these rankings are illustrated
in Figure 4-17.
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FIGUJRE 4-17
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Ratepayers rank construction costs most heavily, followed by timely
implementation and fiscal impacts. They place environmental concerns at the
middle and bottom of the list. The rankings Smith estimates for the
ratepayer group are as follows:
Construction Costs
Timely Implementation
Fiscal Impacts
Transportation Safety
Socioeconomic Impact
Drinking Water
Harbor Surface Water
Equitable Distribution of Regional
Responsibility
Air Quality
Noise
Inland Surface Water
Harbor Ecology
Inland Ecology
Cultural Resources
Visual Impacts
It is interesting to note that the seven most heavily weighted attributes all
might involve financial cost to the ratepayers. The facility's construction
costs obviously will be absorbed by the ratepayers. If the court ordered
schedule is violated, the MWRA may have to pay huge fines. Ratepayers
expect that they will have to make payments in lieu of taxes to offset any
fiscal impacts a sludge facility might have. The transportation safety
attribute involves liability issues and costs. The ratepayers are concerned
with socioeconomic impacts because they believe they might have to
compensate homeowners whose property values decline as a result of the
sludge facility. If a facility polluted drinking water supplies, the ratepayers
might be held liable for expensive cleanup projects. Finally, if the sludge
facility pollutes harbor surface water, the MWRA might be found in violation
of the Clean Water Act again, and fined heavily. The tradeoffs Smith makes
for ratepayers using these rankings are found in Figure 4-18.
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FIGUJRE 4-18
RATEPAYERS' VALUE TRADEOFFS FOR ALL ATTRIBUTES
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Harbor environmental groups place timely implementation at the top
of the list of attributes. They are concerned that a sludge facility be sited
and built quickly, so that sludge will no longer be dumped untreated into
Boston Harbor. As expected, these groups are more concerned with
environmental attributes, and weight the facility's impacts on neighbors and
communities less heavily. The attribute ranking for harbor environmental
groups are:
Timely Implementation
Harbor Surface Water
Harbor Ecology
Visual Impacts
Cultural Resources
Drinking Water
Inland Surface Water
Inland Ecology
Equitable Distribution of Regional
Responsibility
Transportation Safety
Air Quality
Noise
Socioeconomic Impact
Construction Costs
Fiscal Impact
Smith's estimates of the harbor environmental groups' tradeoffs using these
rankings are illustrated in Figure 4-19.
Local environmental groups weight the inland ecology, inland surface
water, and drinking water attributes most heavily. Like harbor
environmental groups, they rank economic and socioeconomic attributes at the
bottom of the list. Local environmental groups are less concerned with
timely implementation than are harbor environmental groups; and are more
concerned with noise and air quality impacts. Smith's guesses of rankings
for the local environmental groups are as follows:
Inland Ecology
Inland Surface Water
Drinking Water
Harbor Ecology
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Harbor Surface Water
Cultural Resources
Visual Impacts
Noise
Air Quality
Transportation Safety
Equitable Distribution of Regional
Responsibility
Timely Implementation
Socioeconomic Impact
Construction Costs
Fiscal Impacts
Value tradeoffs for local environmental groups are displayed in Figure 4-20.
Abutters rank the equitable distribution of regional responsibility
most heavily, followed by transportation safety, air quality, noise, and visual
impacts. These groups rank environmental concerns, cost and timely
implementation low. The rankings for abutters are:
Equitable Distribution of Regional
Responsibility
Transportation Safety
Air Quality
Noise
Visual Impacts
Socioeconomic Impact
Drinking Water
Cultural Resources
Fiscal Impact
Inland Surface Water
Harbor Surface Water
Inland Ecology
Harbor Ecology
Construction Costs
Smith's estimates of the value tradeoffs abutters would make using these
rankings are found in Figure 4-21.
Local officials weight fiscal impact, socioeconomic impact, and
equitable distribution of regional responsibility most heavily among the
attributes. Environmental concerns and timely implementation are ranked at
the bottom of the list. The officials rank construction costs fairly high,
however, above air quality, noise and visual impacts. This reflects their
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FIGURE 4-20
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concern about passing rate increases onto their constituents.
list for local officials is:
Fiscal Impacts
Socioeconomic Impact
Equitable Distribution
Responsibility
Transportation Safety
Drinking Water
Construction Costs
Air Quality
Noise
Visual Impacts
Cultural Resources
Inland Surface Water
Harbor Surface Water
Inland Ecology
Harbor Ecology
Timely Implementation
of Regional
The value tradeoffs for local officials are illustrated in Figure 4-22.
Finally, Smith guesses at ranking for regulators. Regulators weight
timely implementation most heavily, followed by the environmental
attributes--harbor surface water, drinking water, inland surface water, air
quality, and ecology. Regulators rank cost, equitable distribution of regional
responsibility, and fiscal impacts low. The exact rankings are:
Timely Implementation
Harbor Surface Water
Drinking Water
Inland Surface Water
Air Quality
Harbor Ecology
Inland Ecology
Cultural Resources
Transportation Safety
Noise
Visual Impacts
Socioeconomic Impact
Construction costs
Equitable Distribution of Regional
Responsibility
Fiscal Impacts
The regulators' value tradeoffs are illustrated in Figure 4-23.
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Table 4-34 shows how each stakeholder group ranks each attribute.
There is not a lot of agreement between the groups on attribute weights.
For example, the MWRA, local environmental groups, and regulators rank the
equitable distribution of regional responsibility in the bottom third of their
lists, while abutters and local officials rank it in the top third. Local
environmental groups weight the inland ecology attribute most heavily, while
the MWRA, ratepayers, abutters and local officials rank this attribute at the
bottom third of all attributes. Local officials rank fiscal impacts first, while
harbor environmental groups, local environmental groups and regulators rank
them last. There is some agreement among groups on the timely
implementation attribute: the MWRA, harbor environmental groups and
regulators all weight this attribute most heavily. Unfortunately, the other
four stakeholder groups rank timely implementation very low (local officials
rank it last, local environmental groups rank it 12th out of 15).
Results and Conclusions
Smith calculates a utility measure for each site under each possible
technology outcome for each stakeholder group and enters the result into
individual decision trees for each group. The groups do not agree on the
probability that composting will be the technology for the sludge facility.
Table 4-35 shows the probability judgments for each group. The final
results for each stakeholder group, with sensitivity analysis performed on the
technology outcome, are listed in Table 4-36. (Bar graphs showing the
results are displayed in Figures 4-24 through 4-30). Smith then compares
each stakeholder group's top three choices with those of the other groups.
(Table 4-37). She quickly notices that Quincy is in the top three for all of
the groups, and that Spectacle Island and Deer Island are in the top three
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TABLE 4-34
COMPARISON OF STAKEHOLDER GROUPS' ORDERING OF ATTRIBUTES
Transportation Safety 3 4 10 10 2 4 9
Harbor Ecology 10 12 3 4 13 14 6
Inland Ecology 12 13 8 1 12 13 7
Harbor Surface Water 6 7 2 5 11 12 2
Inland Surface Water 11 11 7 2 10 11 4
Drinking Water 4 6 6 3 7 5 3
Air Quality 8 9 11 9 3 7 5
Noise 9 10 12 8 4 8 10
Visual Impacts 14 15 4 7 5 9 11
Cultural Resources 15 14 5 6 8 10 8
Socioeconomic Impact 7 5 13 13 6 2 12
Fiscal Impact 5 3 15 15 9 1 15
Equity 13 8 9 11 1 3 14
Timely Implementation 1 2 1 12 -- 15 1
Construction Costs 2 1 14 14 14 6 13
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TABLE 4-35
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS' PROBABILITY ASSESSMENTS ON TECHNOLOGY OUTCOME
Group Pro
MWRA
Ratepayers
Harbor Environmental
Groups
Local Environmental
Groups
Abutters
Local Officials
Regulators
bability of Comosting Probability of Incineration
.5
.3
.1
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.7
.9
.9
.8
.7
.6
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TABLE 4-36
NEGOTIATION MODEL RESULTS
Technology Choice
Uncertain
Composting
Certain
Incineration
Certain
MWRA
Quincy
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.8077
.7692
.7606
.7287
.6888
.6739
.6009
Deer Island
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.8138
.7727
.7699
.7385
.6634
.6476
.5755
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
RATEPAYERS
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Deer Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.8118
.7592
.7447
.7432
.7031
.7027
.6037
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Quincy
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.8059
.7752
.7655
.7614
.6730
.6715
.5735
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Deer Island
Stoughton
Wilmington
Walpole
HARBOR ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
Quincy
Stoughton
Wilmington
Lynn
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Walpole
.7997
.6729
.6451
.6423
.6406
.6353
.5805
Lynn
Quincy
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.7852
.7533
.7509
.6988
.6626
.6372
.5980
Quincy
Lynn
Stoughton
Wilmington
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Walpole
LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
Quincy
Lynn
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.7782
.6883
.6442
.6345
.6035
.5618
.5571
Deer Island
Lynn
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Stoughton
Wilmington
Walpole
.7536
.7482
.7209
.7043
.5613
.5460
.4996
Quincy
Lynn
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Wilmington
Walpole
Stoughton
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.8426
.7513
.7246
.7188
.7142
.7001
.6263
.8317
.7524
.7376
.7163
.7160
.7160
.6166
.8048
.7137
.6769
.6431
.6283
.6282
.5785
.7846
.6816
.6375
.6213
.6099
.5635
.5619
ABUTTERS
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
LOCAL OFFICIALS
Spectacle Island
Quincy
Deer Island
Lynn
Stoughton
Wilmington
Walpole
.7809
.7381
.7003
.6693
.6298
.6091
.5055
.7952
.7939
.7882
.6823
.6641
.6619
.5111
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Quincy
Stoughton
Wilmington
Walpole
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Quincy
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.8269
.7959
.7270
.7135
.5967
.5623
.4380
.8582
.8140
.7441
.7011
.6419
.6306
.4911
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Stoughton
Lynn
Wilmington
Walpole
REGULATORS
Quincy
Lynn
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.7923
.7390
.7174
.7043
.6323
.6228
.5770
Deer Island
Lynn
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.7793
.7527
.7452
.7180
.6069
.5875
.5516
Quincy
Lynn
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
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.7978
.7236
.6686
.6549
.6467
.6122
.5224
.8153
.7871
.7582
.6784
.6743
.6704
.5196
.8237
.7299
.6951
.6761
.6493
.6464
.5940
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TABLE 4-37
TOP THREE SITES FOR EACH STAKEHOLDER GROUP
MWRA
Quincy
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
RATEPAYERS
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Lynn
HARBOR ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
Quincy
Stoughton
Wilmington
LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
Quincy
Lynn
Spectacle Island
ABUTTERS
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
LOCAL OFFICIALS
Spectacle Island
Quincy
Deer Island
REGULATORS
Quincy
Lynn
Deer Island
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for four of the groups. She believes that she might be able to achieve a
consensus agreement to choose these three sites for further study. The
MWRA, abutters, and local officials already rank these three sites as their
top choices. Smith examines the model for each of the remaining
stakeholders to find out why the three sites--Deer Island, Quincy and
Spectacle Island-- were not ranked more highly by these groups.
Harbor environmental groups rank the Quincy, Stoughton, and
Wilmington sites as their top three choices. Deer Island and Spectacle Island
are ranked fifth and sixth, respectively. Why are the scores for these sites
so low? Is there anything Smith could do to improve these scores? The
harbor environmental groups weighted the attributes of timely implementation,
harbor ecology, harbor surface water, visual impacts and cultural impacts
most heavily. Deer Island scores very low on the harbor ecology and harbor
surface water attributes. The groups were very concerned about the
replaceability of habitats for small mammals living on Deer Island. The site
only had a .08 expected utility on the harbor surface water attribute,
because stormwater runoff and airborne contaminants from Deer Island could
directly pollute Boston Harbor. These groups rated Deer Island low on visual
impacts, and their concern about the remains of an old fort on the site
caused them to rank Deer Island low on cultural impacts, also. What can
Smith do to convince these groups that the impacts on Deer Island will not
be as heavy as expected? She cannot do anything about habitat
replaceability on Deer Island. However, she can improve the harbor
environmental groups' perceptions of surface water impacts by mitigating
these impacts as much as possible--using scrubbers in the incinerator to
reduce the amount or airborne contaminants leaving the stack, or managing
stormwater so that runoff is not a problem. Visual impacts could be
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mitigated by buffering, and Smith could try to design the sludge facility so
that it would not impact the fort. Smith also wonders if harbor
environmental groups, whose primary concern is timely implementation of the
harbor cleanup, would actually hold up a consensual agreement to use Deer
Island for a sludge facility because of these concerns.
The Spectacle Island site also scores low on the attributes that are
most important to harbor environmental groups. They worry that permitting
problems, political problems, and competing public use will delay timely
implementation of the harbor cleanup. They are concerned that stormwater
runoff from the facility could damage lobster trapping grounds nearby, and
that airborne contaminants from an incinerator on the island would pollute
harbor water. They believe that a facility would have moderate or major
visual impacts on harbor views, and they are eager to protect the
archaeological site on the island. Smith can mitigate impacts from runoff
and airborne contaminants through proper management procedures, and can
try to design the facility so that it does not impact the archaeological site.
If she must use an incinerator to treat the sludge, she can try to design a
shorter stack so that visual impacts will be lessened. She does not believe
that harbor environmental groups will hold up implementation of the sludge
project over visual impacts.
Local environmental groups rate Quincy, Lynn and Spectacle Island
as their top three sites. These groups have the same concerns about the
Deer island site as do the harbor environmental groups. Smith believes that
with assurances of mitigation, local environmental groups could be persuaded
to drop the Lynn site and include Deer Island among their top three.
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Quincy, Lynn and Deer Island are the three preferred sites for
regulators. Spectacle Island is ranked fourth. The regulators share the
concerns of harbor environmental groups about Spectacle Island--problems
with timely implementation, impacts on harbor surface water, and visual
impacts. Smith hopes that assurances of mitigation will convince regulators
to move Spectacle Island up in their list.
Ratepayers rank Quincy, Spectacle Island and Lynn as their
preferred choices. Deer Island is ranked fourth. However, the total utility
score for Deer Island is only .0015 utiles less than the score for Lynn.
Ratepayers share the concerns of environmental groups about environmental
impacts on Deer Island. Smith believes that the mitigation measures she
plans to propose will easily persuade ratepayers to accept Deer Island in
their top three group.
Smith wonders if she can do anything to change the stakeholder
groups' perceptions about the technology outcome. If the MWRA started an
extensive enforcement program to rid the sludge of heavy metals and allow
composting, would consensus among the groups about a site be more likely?
Sensitivity analysis of the model results (Table 4-36) show that certainty
about technology outcome changes the top three sites for several of the
stakeholder groups. For example, abutters prefer Lynn to Quincy when
composting is a certainty. Changing the groups' perceptions of technology
probabilities does not appear to bring them closer to consensus, however.
Smith is disturbed about the guesses she had to make about the
stakeholder groups' utility functions. To test the model results' sensitivity
to the shape of utility curves, Smith calculates new figures for each group,
this time assuming that the groups are all risk-neutral on each attribute.
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The results, displayed in Table 4-38, show that the choice of the top three
sites does not change for three of the groups (the MWRA, abutters and local
officials). Two of the groups--ratepayers and regulators--replace Lynn with
Spectacle Island in the top three rankings. The risk-neutral results show
five groups in agreement over Quincy, Spectacle Island and Deer Island as
the preferred sites.
From the results of this model, Smith could decide to reserve the
Deer Island, Quincy and Spectacle Island sites for further study. She could
also start to design mitigation strategies to deal with surface water impacts
and visual impacts. She can also investigate the possibility of designing the
facility to reduce visual and cultural impacts.
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TABLE 4-38
NEGOTIATION MODEL RESULTS -- RISK NEUTRAL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Original Model Results Risk Neutral Results
MWRA
Quincy
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.8077
.7692
.7606
.7287
.6888
.6739
.6009
Deer Island
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
Lynn
RATEPAYERS
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Deer Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.8118
.7592
.7447
.7432
.7031
.7027
.6037
Quincy
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
Lynn
HARBOR ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
Quincy
Stoughton
Wilmington
Lynn
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Walpole
.7997
.6729
.6451
.6423
.6406
.6353
.5805
Quincy
Lynn
Stoughton
Wilmington
Deer Island
Walpole
Spectacle Island
LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
Quincy
Lynn
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.7782
.6883
.6442
.6346
.6035
.5618
.5571
Quincy
Lynn
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Walpole
Wilmington
Stoughton
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.7211
.7104
.6560
.6120
.5729
.5414
.5141
.7140
.6988
.6570
.6193
.5997
.5446
.5192
.6995
.6230
.5930
.5800
.5608
.5507
.5028
.7504
.6546
.6180
.6070
.5265
.5113
.4588
ABUTTERS
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
LOCAL OFFICIALS
Spectacle Island
Quincy
Deer Island
Lynn
Stoughton
Wilmington
Walpole
.7809
.7381
.7003
.6693
.6298
.6091
.5055
.7952
.7939
.7882
.6823
.6641
.6619
.5111
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Quincy
Stoughton
Wilmington
Lynn
Walpole
Spectacle Island
Deer Island
Quincy
Stoughton
Wilmington
Lynn
Walpole
REGULATORS
Quincy
Lynn
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
.7923
.7390
.7174
.7043
.6323
.6228
.5770
Quincy
Deer Island
Spectacle Island
Lynn
Wilmington
Stoughton
Walpole
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.7325
.6438
..6414
.5172
.5143
.5012
.3904
.7803
.7371
.6819
.5338
.5201
.5044
.3899
.7441
.6644
.6224
.6120
.5622
.5439
.5279
THE RISK PERCEPTION MODEL
Smith is pleased with the results of the negotiation model. She has
gained new insights into the areas of agreement and disagreement among
groups with an interest in the sludge facility siting decision. She believes
there is one major weakness in the negotiation model, however--it does not
treat public health risks. Surely stakeholder groups will be interested in the
public health impacts of a sludge facility. Smith is also intrigued by the
risk management theory of siting (Elliott, 1984). For her final cut at the
siting problem, she decides to model the decision as a risk management
problem.
Structuring Objectives for the Decision
Smith has only one objective under the risk management model--to
build a facility at a site where the risks to public health will be low. Her
decision is very dependent on the technology the MWRA will use to treat the
sludge. If composting is the technology, any risks to public health from the
sludge will be absorbed by the end users of the sludge--the people who put
the compost on their gardens or eat food from farms that use the sludge.
Because the compost will be sold in the same market no matter what site is
chosen for the facility, the public health impacts of a composting facility are
not site-specific, and are therefore eliminated from Smith's model. She
therefore rates the public health risk from a composting facility at each site
as low, with a utility of 1. She will concentrate on measuring the public
health impacts of an incinerator. These impacts are site-specific. Smith
builds a decision tree to represent her problem (Figure 5-1).
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FIGURE 5-1
DECISION TREE STRUCTURE FOR THE RISK PERCEPTION MODEL
DEER ISLAND___ C COMPOSTING
C!
INCINERATION_
LYNN C CONPOSTING
C
INCINERATION_
QUIICY C CONPOSTING
CI
INCINERATION_
SITING DECISION. DISPECTACLE ISLAND C COMPOSTING
C
INCINERATION_
STOUGHTON C CONPOSTING
C:
INCINERATION
WALPOLE_
WILMINGTON
C CONPOSTING
C
INCINERATION_
C CONPOSTING
C
INCINERATION_
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Defining Attributes and Performance Measures
How should Smith measure the public health risk from a sludge
incinerator at each site? Decisions involving health risk involve the problem
of defining consequence scope (Lathrop and Watson, 1982). Should Smith
measure the facility's impacts on health during the life of the facility
(1995--2020)? Or should she try to predict the facility's more long-term
impact on public health? Which health impacts should she measure? Should
she count the predicted number of deaths from cancer due to the facility, or
should she include acute and chronic diseases that do not result in death?
Who is the "public" whose health she is concerned with? Is it the workers in
the sludge facility, or is it the people who live near the site? How far away
from the site must one live before Smith no longer has to be concerned about
health impacts?
Smith's definition of health risk is severely limited by the amount
and type of information she has on the sites. She has no risk assessments
for any of the sites; nor does she have figures on how many deaths or cases
of illness could result from emissions from an incinerator burning sludge
containing certain levels of heavy metals. Instead, she has maps showing
the dry deposition rate of particulates from an incinerator at each site. She
also has a copy of the EPA's proposed regulation on sludge treatment. (U.S.
EPA, 1989). This rule sets limits on the amount of heavy metals and other
toxics that sludge can contain for each type of treatment technology. The
limits are based on EPA's assessment of what level of health risk is
acceptable from each of these technologies. The acceptable risk standard is
based on mortality figures--the additional number of cancer deaths in a
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population due to the sludge treatment--and does not deal with illness and
other causes of death.
Smith is frustrated by her lack of information about health risks at
each site, but decides to build a model using the information she has to see
if it will give her any insights into the risk management aspects of the
sludge facility siting problem. The dry deposition rate maps show her
generally how much particulate matter is expected to settle on what areas
around a facility. She uses the information on the maps to construct a scale
measuring health risk. The levels of the scale range from 0 (no health risk)
to 4 (extremely high risk). Low risk (level 1) means that particulates fall
on populated areas at a rate of 5000 grams per minute (g/m); moderate risk
(level 2), 10,000 g/m; and high risk (level 3) 15,000 g/m. If 30,000 g/m or
more would settle on a populated area, the risk is judged to be extremely
high (level 4).
Assessing Impacts and Probabilities
Next, Smith must decide who will make the assessments of risk at
each site. Should she ask risk assessment experts to judge each site? Or
should she use the risk assessments of lay people--especially those living
near each site-- as inputs in her model? Because she is interested in
defining the siting decision as a problem in dealing with and managing
differing risk perceptions, she decides to use her own risk assessments and
those of abutter groups in the model. As in the negotiation model, she will
try to make educated guesses at how abutters would perceive the risks of a
sludge facility.
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The maps for the site at Deer Island show that high levels of
particulates will settle on unpopulated harbor islands. Low level of
deposition might reach the Winthrop neighborhood of Point Shirley. Smith
judges that the probability that there will be no risk impacts from a facility
at Deer Island is 80 percent, and there is a 20 percent probability that risk
will be low. Smith guesses that abutters would believe the probability of no
impacts to be 10 percent; the probability of low impacts, 40 percent; and the
probability of moderate impact, 50 percent.
The air modeling results predict that high levels of particulate
matter will settle on the downtown Lynn area. Smith believes that there is
a 60 percent probability that health impacts will be moderate, and a 40
percent chance that they will be high. Abutters judge that there is a 50
percent probability that these impacts will be extremely high; a 40 percent
chance they will be high; and a 10 percent chance they will be moderate.
At the Quincy site, very heavy levels of particulates could settle on
nearby populated areas. Smith predicts that the probability that health
impacts will be extremely high is 40 percent; that they will be high, 40
percent; and that they will be moderate, 20 percent. Abutters believe there
is a 70 percent chance that impacts will be extremely high at the Quincy
site. They also judge that the probability that impacts will be high is 20
percent; and that they will be moderate, 10 percent.
Heavy levels of particulates from a facility on Spectacle Island
might impact a hospital on nearby Long Island. Low levels from the facility
would reach Castle and Thompson Islands, areas used for recreation. Smith
judges the probability that the impacts from a facility on Spectacle Island
will be low to be 70 percent; and that they will be moderate, 30 percent.
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Abutters (people who live on the harbor) predict that there is a 30 percent
chance that health impacts from a facility will be high; a 50 percent chance
that they will be moderate; and a 20 percent chance that they will be low.
At the Stoughton site, moderate levels of particulates may settle on
a nearby industrial part, and low levels could reach moderately populated
areas. Smith judges that there is a 50 percent chance that impacts will be
low, and a 50 percent chance that they will be moderate. Abutters believe
that there is a 10 percent chance that impacts will be low; a 40 percent
chance they will be moderate; and a 50 percent chance they will be high.
Low and moderate levels of particulates from an incinerator at the Walpole
site could settle on moderately populated areas. Smith judges that there is
a 50 percent probability that impacts at the site will be low, and a 50
percent probability that they will be moderate. Abutters believe that there
is a 10 percent probability that impacts will be low; a 40 percent probability
that they will be moderate; and a 50 percent chance that they will be high.
Smith does not have a dry deposition rate map for the Wilmington
site. She therefore bases her assessments on the rates at other inland sites.
She judges that there is a 20 percent chance that there will be no impact
from a facility at the Wilmington site; a 60 percent chance that impacts will
be low; and a 20 percent chance that they will be moderate. Abutters
believe there is a 30 percent probability that impacts will be low; a 50
percent probability that they will be moderate; and a 20 percent probability
that they will be high.
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Assessing Preferences
Smith now assesses her preferences for the various health impact
levels. She also guesses at utility assessments for abutters. The utility
functions are graphed in Figure 5-2. Smith's function shows that she
embraces the EPA's concept of "acceptable risk". She believes that impacts
that are low or moderate are "acceptable"--therefore she is risk-neutral for
these impact levels. Abutters, on the other hand, are extremely risk-averse
to health impacts.
Results and Conclusions
Because Smith is only measuring one attribute--health risk defined
as increased cancer mortality rates--she does not have to make tradeoffs
among many objectives. She calculates the expected utility for impacts at
each site (Table 5-1), and feeds these figures into the decision tree. Smith
judges the probability that the technology will be composting at 50 percent,
while abutters believe that probability to be only 20 percent.
The results for the MWRA are as follows:
Deer Island .985
Wilmington .925
Spectacle Island .9025
Stoughton .8875
Walpole .8875
Lynn .81
Quincy .67
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TABLE 5-1
EXPECTED UTILITY OF IMPACTS
Site
Deer Island
Lynn
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Stoughton
Walpole
Wilmington
EU for the MWRA
.97
.62
.34
.805
.775
.775
.85
EU for Abutters
.864
.312
.196
.756
.701
.701
.789
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The results for abutters are:
Deer Island .8912
Wilmington .8312
Spectacle Island .8048
Stoughton .7608
Walpole .7608
Lynn .4496
Quincy .3568
Both the MWRA and abutters agree in their rankings of health risks.
Even so, Smith is dissatisfied with the results of this model. She is not
very confident in the judgments she made to get these results. She might
conclude that she should eliminate the Stoughton, Walpole, Lynn and Quincy
sites from further consideration. However, she is wary of doing so, because
of the many uncertainties in this model. She is not at all comfortable with
the amount of information she had to use in the model. She is also unsure
whether she should use the EPA's acceptable risk example to measure her
utilities. Her impact levels do not correspond to any information in the EPA
regulation. How can she be certain that moderate risk, as she has measured
it, is really acceptable? She is also concerned about an information
mismatch between the deposition maps her air quality specialists produced
and the EPA's measurement of risk from incinerators. Her maps predict the
amount of particulates that will settle on certain areas. The EPA, on the
other hand, bases its figures on the assumption that particulates will remain
in the air, and that people will get cancer from breathing them. Her -two
information sources, therefore, do not measure the same risk pathways.
Smith also expected differences between the MWRA's and abutters'
perceptions of risk. The abutters believe that severe health impacts are
more likely to occur than does the MWRA, but the differences are not enough
to change the rankings of sites. Smith suspects that a richer model,
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evaluating many types of health risks and using more complete information,
might capture these differences in perception much better.
Smith does not believe she has learned enough from this model to be
able to choose among the seven sites. She has learned, however, that the
health risk issue is very uncertain, and could be extremely important to her
decision and choice of siting strategy. She therefore decides to seek further
information about the health risks at each site.
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CONCLUSIONS
Now that Smith has completed modeling the sludge facility siting
problem four different ways, she tries to decide what insights into the
problem she has gained from the modeling exercise. First, she looks at each
model separately. How comfortable is she about the model's results and the
modeling process itself? Is the model comprehensive? Does the simplification
and aggregation necessary for decision analysis modeling result in the loss of
any important components of the problem? Does the model accurately reflect
the problem? How clear are the decision points--is the choice of three sites
for further study obvious from the model results? How do the model results
contrast with Smith's intuitions about the problem? Were the results a
surprise to her in any way?
Analysis of Models
Smith is fairly comfortable about the technical model's results and
the judgments she made in building the model. She does not believe that
any important technical considerations were lost through simplification in
this model--in fact, she was surprised at how little information really
mattered to the decision, and how many of the technical criteria considered
in the consultants' reports simply did not matter when comparing sites. She
does not think the technical model accurately represents the siting decision,
however, because it contains little analysis about the facility's impacts on
people. The decision points in the model are clear--there are real
differences in the utilities of the sites, and the top three site choices are
easy to make. Smith was a bit surprised by the results of this model.
Before beginning the modeling exercise, she had believed that the Lynn and
Spectacle Island sites would rate fairly high on technical criteria, since they
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have been used for industrial purposes before. She was surprised to see
that they ranked low in the technical model results.
Although Smith is comfortable with the judgments she made in the
political model, she would not like them to become public. She believes that
making her beliefs about the probability that political actors will act in a
certain way public will "reveal her hand" in subsequent negotiations with
them. She feels that the model handles the political considerations of the
siting decision comprehensively, and that nothing was lost in the
simplification process. The results of this model do not point to a clear
choice of three sites for further review. Many sites have the same scores.
Before modeling the problem, she had believed that the state Senate
President would be the primary political roadblock to using Spectacle Island.
She was surprised to -learn that a synergy existed between the Senate
President's and the Secretary of Transportation's support of the site for
other uses.
Smith is uncomfortable with the guesswork she had to make to build
the negotiation model. She learned a lot from her discussions with
representatives of stakeholder groups, but wishes that the probability, utility
and tradeoff assessments she made for these groups were more precise. She
also believes that some important elements of the problem were lost in the
simplification process of modeling. To make the model less cumbersome, she
chose to aggregate the seven groups of abutters into one group. This
simplification makes consensus appear more easy to achieve than it actually
might be. True, abutters' interests were best addressed by choosing
Spectacle Island, Deer Island and Quincy as possible sites for a facility, but
the individual abutters at these sites would not favor use of these sites.
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Smith also believes that many important interactions between
attributes are left out of the negotiation model because of the additive
utility independence assumption. For example, ratepayers preferences for
various levels of environmental impacts may be dependent on the level of
construction costs at a site. Simplifying the model does not allow Smith to
study these dependencies.
While there are noticeable differences among the utility scores for
each site by each stakeholder group, the final conclusions of the negotiation
model are not all that clear. Several groups might rank Deer Island,
Spectacle Island and Quincy as their top three choices, but it is not certain
that the other groups will agree to drop their choices in favor of these sites,
even if mitigation and compensation measures are offered. Smith was
surprised that the equitable distribution of regional responsibility and
concerns about the stigma effect would be so important to abutters. Before
engaging in the modeling exercise, she had assumed that neighbors would be
most concerned with noise and odor impacts and transportation safety issues.
Smith is extremely uncomfortable with the results of the risk model.
She is frustrated by the lack of information about health risks, and wary of
the many manipulations of data she had to perform and value judgments she
had to make to model the problem. She is also uncomfortable with having to
assess the desirability of various levels of risk. She would not want these
assessments to be made public, even if she had proper information about the
risks at each site. She is aware of the many assumptions that went into the
EPA's definition of acceptable risk for sludge incineration, and believes that
the definition is really very uncertain.
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The risk model does not accurately represent the sludge siting
problem. Because it only measures cancer mortality rates, it is concerned
with only a fragment of public health. Smith would like more information
about a sludge incinerator's impacts on minor and serious illnesses.
What has the exercise of modeling the sludge siting problem four
different ways taught Smith about choosing three sites for further
consideration? Table 6-1 shows each model's recommendation of whether to
drop a site or keep it for further study. No one site is chosen by all four
models. The results of all four models determine that only one site, Lynn,
should definitely be dropped. The Quincy site rates high in three of the
models--the technical, political expediency and negotiation models--but low
in the risk model. The results of the negotiation and risk perception models
tell Smith to keep Spectacle Island, but the technical and political
expediency models tell her to drop it.
Smith believes that the negotiation model represents the siting
problem most comprehensively, so she decides to follow its recommendations
and retain Deer Island, Quincy and Spectacle Island for further study.
Because she is so uncomfortable with the uncertainties and data deficiencies
of the risk perception model, she decides to order detailed health risk
studies on all of the sites except Lynn. If the results of these studies show
that a facility at Quincy would pose high health risks, she could replace
Quincy with one of the inland sites. She remains wary about the political
problems at Spectacle Island, but decides that if that site appears to be the
clear choice after further analysis, she might risk delay caused by
negotiation with the Senate President and Secretary of Transportation.
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TABLE 6-1
COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS
Site
Deer Island
Lynn
Quincy
Spectacle Island
Stoughton
Walpole
Wilmington
Technical
Retain
Drop
Retain
Drop
Drop
Drop
Retain
Political
Drop
Drop
Retain
Drop
Retain
Retain
Retain
Negotiation
Retain
Drop
Retain
Retain
Drop
Drop
Drop
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Risk
Retain
Drop
Drop
Retain
Drop
Drop
Retain
What has the decision analysis modeling exercise taught Smith about
what strategy of siting to use? She believes that none of the four models
represents the problem completely, but that the negotiation model comes
close. She decides to use a mix of the negotiation and risk management
strategies. She will try to negotiate with the stakeholder groups to choose a
final preferred site. She will try to validate her guesses about the groups'
probability assessments, preferences and value tradeoffs. While she will not
build another model, she will use the insights gained from the negotiation
model exercise to offer compensation packages and mitigation strategies. She
will involve the abutters to the final three sites in the risk assessment
studies, so that she can learn about their perceptions of the health risks
posed by the sludge facility.
Constraints and Pitfalls in the Further Use of Modeling
Smith is pleased with the results of the modeling exercise, and is
tempted to make her decision of a preferred site from among the three
finalists by using a new negotiation model, this time involving real
probability, utility and value tradeoff assessments for the stakeholder
groups. There are several constraints and pitfalls Smith would face if she
were to attempt to build a new model to make the next decision. Some of
these problems are institutional ones a public policy decision maker faces;
some of them are inherent in decision analysis modeling techniques.
First, decision analysis presents unfamiliar measurement problems to
decision makers and stakeholder groups. The public is not used to
quantifying many intangible values--for example, equity or aesthetic
values--and may not be able to make the measurement judgments necessary
to decision analysis modeling. (Keeney and Raiffa, 1972). Decision analysis
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also forces decision makers to make unfamiliar choices in situations with
which they have little experience--most notably, making choices between
gambles to assess utilities. (Covello, 1987). These unfamiliar measurement
problems may cause decision makers and stakeholder groups to give imprecise
and inaccurate judgments for the model. The model results might therefore
not represent these groups' true values at all.
Second, because decision analysis is built upon subjective judgments
of probabilities, it is vulnerable to the biases and cognitive illusions that
can affect probability judgments. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identify
three types of heuristics- -mental procedures to simplify the analysis of
complex probability judgments--that could bias a decision maker's probability
assessments. "Representativeness" is used by decision makers to classify an
unknown event into a category with which the decision maker is already
familiar. For example, an individual's estimate of the probability of high
health risks at a sludge facility is likely to depend on whether he or she
perceives an incinerator to be like a nuclear power plant or a local trash
dump. (Elliott, 1984). Decision makers also use the heuristic of
"availability" to judge the probability of impacts at a facility. This
cognitive simplification tool allows individuals to assess the probability of an
impact by the ease with which other instances of that impact can be brought
to mind. For example, if an individual has read many recent news reports
about old leaking landfills, he or she may be more likely to believe that a
new landfill might leak. Finally, decision makers make adjustments to an
anchor when they are assessing probabilities. An individual might start his
or her probability assessments from a certain value (the anchor) and adjust
this value to get the rest of the probability judgments. For example, Smith
may assess the probability of high ecological impacts at a site to be 80
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percent, and then base her assessment of the probability of surface water
impacts on this figure.
Other types of biases may affect probability inputs into a decision
analysis model. Experts are likely to build safety margins into their
judgments (Covello, 1987). Lay people who live near the proposed site of a
project are more likely to believe that the project's risks outweigh its
benefits than are people who live away from the site. (Marks and von
Winterfeldt, 1984).
Another problem with using decision analysis for siting decisions is
that the method requires decision makers to make their values explicit.
Decision makers may not want to use a model that reveals their utilities for
such things as human lives. To the public, the method may seem callous.
(Fischhoff, et al., 1981). The decision analysis methodology assumes that
decision makers and stakeholder groups will reveal their true preferences and
value tradeoffs. (Covello, 1987). In fact, these groups may not reply
honestly to questions about their probability judgments and preference values
for strategic reasons. For example, the MWRA might not want to reveal that
it believes that the probability that the sludge facility will be a composting
facility is only 50 percent. Smith might believe that it will be easier to get
people to accept a composting facility, so she might not want to reveal
publicly that the technology outcome is an uncertainty. Stakeholder groups
might engage in "gaming"- -deliberately exaggerating their probability
assessments or providing inaccurate value tradeoffs--to influence the results
of the model. (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986).
Decision makers might not want to make their judgments on political
issues public. (Keeney and Raiffa, 1972). For example, Smith might believe
- 220' -
that if her probability assessments about whether the state Senate President
will oppose siting the sludge facility on Spectacle Island are made public, her
negotiating position with the President would be weakened.
Decision analysis also assumes that decision makers and stakeholder
groups have values about everything that goes into the model. In many
cases, this may not be true--for example, ratepayers, who are concerned
only about construction and operating costs at a facility, may have never
considered how they feel about visual impacts, or about equity issues. But
in order to build a model, these groups must articulate values about these
issues. The preferences and value tradeoffs assessed from these groups may
not be accurate, because the group's values are unformed. (Fischhoff, 1980).
Another pitfall of using decision analysis, or any kind of formal
analytic method, for that matter, is that the modeling of a problem may
become the problem. (Quade, 1980). A decision maker may find himself or
herself caught up in the modeling process, and may lose sight of the bigger
policy problem. For example, in the risk perception model, Smith had little
information, but felt forced to use the information she did have in perhaps
inappropriate ways for the sake of completing a model.
Decision analysis may not fit into the legal institutions that
currently exist to make siting decisions. Decision analysis allows a decision
maker to focus on only the information that is necessary to differentiate
between and decide among sites. Most siting decisions are subject to federal
and state environmental impact assessment laws and regulations. For
example, the sludge siting decision must be reviewed under the Massachusetts
Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). These statutes require the MWRA to study information about many
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different impacts, not just those that are crucial to a decision. The
philosophy of these laws Is that an agency should gather all of the
information about every factor that could influence a decision, and then
make a decision. Decision analysis, on the other hand, focuses on narrowing
a problem to its vital components, and then gathering more information about
those factors that are really important to the decision. (Behn and Vaupel,
1982).
Finally, using decision analysis to make facility siting decisions may
perpetuate the mystique of a "technical fix" for societal problems.
(Fischhoff, 1980). Problems are believed to be easily solved by building
models and manipulating data. In fact, facility siting conflicts may be
insoluble problems. The "not in my backyard" syndrome may represent deeply
rooted societal conflicts about equity, governmental power, and technology.
Decision analysis, by presenting a seemingly "easy" way to solve problems,
may allow decision makers to believe that they can ignore these conflicts.
(Fischhoff, 1980).
If Smith were to use decision analysis to decide among the final
three sites for a sludge facility, she would have to wrestle with all of these
problems. The benefits of the analysis might not be worth the time, money
and effort that would go into this next phase of modeling. No matter how
she decides to approach the next stage of the siting problem, Smith has
benefited from using decision analysis for problem formulation. She has
looked at the problem through different lenses, and has discovered the many
different facets of the siting decision. She has gained some insight into
possible siting strategies. She has learned what further information she
needs to make a decision, and has decided where to concentrate her scarce
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time and money resources. She has put herself in the shoes of stakeholder
groups, and has thus learned about their values and concerns in a much
more active way than if she had merely discussed the problem generally with
them. Her uncertainties about the guesses she made about these groups'
probability assessments, preferences, and value tradeoffs form a basis for
further learning. She has identified the uncertainties inherent in the siting
problem, and has evaluated how to resolve the ones that are important. Her
own preferences and tradeoffs among objectives are clearer to her. Building
decision analysis models forced her to systematically look at the problem in
its entirety. She now has a "big picture" of the problem in her mind, and
can avoid making decisions based on only one element of the problem.
Perhaps most importantly, using decision analysis has given her a deep
personal understanding of the problem that she would not have had if she
had merely relied on consultant and staff reports. She can now design a
strategy to site the sludge facility, confident that she has brought some
order to an extremely messy problem.
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